Property Rights Protection And Implementation

The relationship between state power and property rights is of special importance for the transforming economy, studies in this field both domestic and abroad have accumulated rich literature, but advanced exploration is absent. The basic purpose of this article, consisted by theoretical analysis and cases in China, is to depict the effects of state's behavior on property rights. With the help of incomplete contract theory,, in part one, the author presents three models: the first model proves that the state would arrange property rights according to its benefits under different ownerships; the second model argues the state's behavior toward protecting the property rights' exclusiveness, the author puts the state in a coalitional game which suggests state could benefit from the protection; the third model illustrates that the state would prohibit the property from transference until it's safety requirement was met.In part two, this article examines the three models with the cases of land tenure and relative institution arrangements in last half century. Firstly, the author describes the process of institutional changes in rural China, explains why the collectivization's failure by a new framework, and reviews the differences between the self-enforcement property rights and third party enforcement ones. Secondly, we discuss the legislation of villager's autonomy, and describe it as a endeavor of the state to protect the exclusiveness of the rights about land. Last but not least, the author focus on the puzzle of land transference, from the point of view, the state prefer the cooperation among the farmers to the trade among them, as a result, it neglected its duty to establish the market of land.