Long-term Profit Model And Its Pension Funds To Participate In Corporate Governance

一,Pension funds has played important role in corporate governance in developed countries ,such as United States, Japan, Europe union, since 1990s', which ,as, relational investor, improved the efficiency of invested company, and the long run healthy condition of itself.The disputed theoretical problem now lies in how pension funds execute relational investment .As for China , it is necessary to find out the links between pension funds reform and corporate governance reform, to discuss the role of pension funds in corporate governance ,and the way they play it.To solve the problem above, we have to answer the following three related questions :why long run profit is possible, how corporate governance act on the creating long run profit ,and how pension funds participate in corporate governance actively.二,The paper consists of five chapters.Chapter 0 : introductionThe chapter summaries the meaning, structure and research methods of this paper . Chapter 1: two start points of long run profit research.It mainly make some critical comments on current profit creating theory and expound on two start points of our research. Firstly, we must consider the ignorance condition in innovation and profit creating, as well as how to solve it by cognition and learning. Secondly, we must consider difficulty lied in cooperation among team members. Trust is the key to solve the puzzle of cooperation ---externality and tacit knowledge. Based on the research of team and cooperation by Sen, Holmstrom and Coleman etc, we propound five prerequisites of trust –forming, hey are also five norms of evaluating corporate governance .Trust leads to endogenous social capital of firm. We try to introduce cognitive psychological analysis and social capital perspective into profit-creating theory.Chapter 2 : social capital, collaborative learning and firms' long run profit.In this chapter ,we point out that long run profit originate from collaborative learning of members in firm, the efficacy of which determine by endogenous social capital in the firm. Schumpter disclose the relation between innovation and economical profit,while we expatiate on the relation innovation capacity and collaborative, as well as the psychological institution ,process and impetus of collaborative learning.Chapter 3: corporate governance and the role of participants from the perspective of long run profit.Firstly, we make some comments on current theory of corporate governance, and discuss the meaning and aims of corporate governance, as well as how to evaluate the efficacy of it. Then ,control rights of employee, manager, and investor in corporate governance are analyzed separately, the examples are from U.S.A, Japan, and Germany.Chapter 4: how pension funds play a part in corporate governance from the perspective of long run profit.Firstly we expatiate on the role of pension funds ,as institutional investor ,in corporate governance.Then we discuss how pension funds play actively in it. Pension funds needs to built the system to evaluate long run profit creating capacity of invested company,as well as the transmitting institution of relational investor governance.Chapter 5: some suggestion on the role of pension funds in Chinese corporate governance reform and how they play a part in it.We make some analysis of Chinese corporate governance reform and pension funds reform using the theoretical frame above, and find out that pension funds reform and corporate governance reform act an each other and twine together. Some links between them are discovered.Then we try to testify that "three parts co-governance" is better than "shareholder's unilateral governance", of course, policy reform is needed to satisfy the condition of pension funds participating actively in corporate governance.三,The innovation of the paper lies mainly in:1.The theme of the paper is prospective.Our aim is to solve three theoretical puzzles"how long run profit is made?""how corporate governance leads t...