A Theoretical Study On Market Order: Perspective From Game Analysis On The Market Interest

Market order is a norm for commodity economy, and thus market order problems are a special phenomenon of the commodity economy. Since China launched the reform and open- door policy in the late 1970' s, market order problems accordingly have emerged accompanying with the recovery of commodity economy in the market- oriented reform process. It may be said that people have not yet been prepared to encounter such problems in the transition course and thus, when facing the mounting market disorder phenomena, psychological moods such as anger, disappointment, and suspicion seem to dominate the society. To provide the society with the intellectual support so as to help people correctly thinking over and solving up the market disorder problems, it means an urgent task for the theoretical researchers. For this purpose this thesis set out with game analysis on the market interest to reveal the mechanism and evolution of the market order, to raise a point of view that the governance mechanism of market order is a combination of market legislation and market autonomy, and to propose the relevant policy implications on the Chinese regard.l.The organization of the thesis. This thesis is structurally divided into six chapters. In chapter 1 a literature review on the existing studies on market order is presented, which is followed by some definitions on order, market order and other concerning concepts, and this chapter ends with a discussion on the impacts of market order upon the economic society. Chapter 2 studies the theoretical evolution of market order studies in the foreign literature. The studies cover the emergence of market order in the early times, the agrianian school on the nature order, the spontaneous order thought in the Scottish tradition, Buchanan's thought on the market order based on constitutional liberalism, German's views on ordered liberalism, and order concepts in the neo-institutional economics. The author provides a critical review on the aforementioned studies and, based on these, proposes a new perspective for market order studies, i.e. game analysis on the market interest. Chapter 3 explores the formation mechanism and the evolution mechanism of market order, where the author persists that stable market order results from a game process of the market involvers on the market interest Chapter 4 analyses the major factors affecting market order such as market information, market rules and market participators. In chapter 5 the author maintains that, due to the complexity of the game process on the market interest, the key mechanism of market order governance is market legislation. In this chapter the author discusses the fundamental principles and main structure of the market legislation, the combination of market legislation and market autonomy which means a need for the social trust, a cost-saving mechanism, and also the American experience on market order governance.In chapter 6 the author begins with a description on various market disorder phenomena in the current transitional Chinese economy, then provides an anatomy on the causes of market disorder, and finally proposes a comprehensive policy suggestions to solve out the market disorder problems in the market-oriented reform process2.The main points and the underlying logic of this thesis may be summarized as follows: (1) From the behavioral perspective interest conflicts constitute the essential cause of market disorder. And thus setting up rational interest mechanism is the key point for making the market from disorder to order. The rational interest mechanism should protect the justification of individual interest as well as coordinate the inter-individual interest conflicts. (2) Seeing that the self-interest nature of human behavior, the inclination to opportunism, the bounded rationality, and the scarcityof both social resources and wealth, the interest conflicts seem to be unavoidable and inevitable. A harmonious and orderly market order comes from both the mechanism of self-interest guidance and the mechanism of social coordinati...