System, The Division Of The Evolution Of Economic Performance - Poverty In The System Based On Division Of Labor Dimension Analysis

The dissertation studies the evolutionary process of division in order to explore the institutions how to affect it and decide the economic performance at last by using dynamic game theory, evolutionary game theory, marginal analysis, institutional analysis and so on. It is different from the framework of new neoclassical comparative statics because the thesis obeys the evolutionary perspective.Increasing return and Comparative Advantage are decided by institutional arrangement, which influence on technical choice and investment level. Individual game strategies and transaction costs decide the level of division, the path of evolution in division and economic performance. So we can explore the truth insde the box of evolution in division, open out the rules we should obey during insitutional change if efficient economic increasing is demanded.And then author analyze some agricultural economic institutions in China by the theoretic framework, which impeded evolution in division of labor and made Chinese peasantry fall into institutionalized poverty trap. The author also discusses the choice-effect of the system of farmland to productive technology byanalyzing the decision procedure of undertaking-farmland farmer. The system of undertaking-farmland hampers the scale economy technology being applied to agriculture. It is the important reason that exists the externality of investment with the scale economy technology.By analyzing institutionalized linkage of agricultural economic system, the conclusion was drawn out that the certain land rights is important to develop the modern agriculture and it is the only way that the government should reduce interfering economy step by step and realize market-directed economy at last.