Study On Financing Decision Of Enterprise Based On Informational Asymmetry

The investment decision & financing decision, which is the most important parts of the three financial policies in modern financial theory, have been receiving Chinese and foreign financial scholars' attention all the time. Since investment integrate, mutual affect with the financing of enterprise, how to finance the investing fund needed by enterprise, how to choose and to compound between investment projects so as to form the satisfied earnings of the enterprise, how the financing influence and pin down investment each other, what kinds of financing portfolio can optimize the capital structure of enterprise, all these subjects are being investigated further and having realistic meanings for the time being.The important one of traditional economic prerequisite is that " economic persons" have perfect information. The perfect information assume that all the parties in market posses as much as the same information so as to have the same expectancy to the profit of the enterprise. In fact, the mangers' information are asymmetric with that investors'. Only the insiders managing the enterprise know the truth of the enterprise really. The outside investors judge the profitability and the perspective of the corporation just by checking the information such as the balance statements and the profit statements etc which the enterprise disclose. So the mangers have the advantage of game between mangers and investors. Both sides are in the environment of a typical informational asymmetry.The issue of capital structure under informational asymmetry is the kernel issue of corporate designing its interest structure, which concerns the behavior characteristic of the company directly, including the characteristics of investing behavior, financing behavior and the dividend behavior. In view of the above, it is author's purpose to study financing decision of enterprise under informational asymmetry so as to establish the reasonable financing structure, to optimize the disposal of fund and to realize the goal in value of enterprise.This paper is evolved along calibration of financing decision, the optimal capital disposal, the optimization of static financing decision and dynamic financing decision by referencing the achievements and methods of western financial scholars, based on informational asymmetry, run through financing. The model is constructed to analyze. The author studied in theory the mechanism of asymmetric information to form, the optimal disposal of capital under informational asymmetry, the process to choose the objective between the financing style, establishing the static and dynamic model to optimize the financing decision, explored the influence on financing decision exerted by the cost to acquire information and the precision of information using synthetically the knowledge of microeconomics , the asymmetric information theory relating with capital structure,the agent cost theory, the principal-agent theory, the game theory ,the financial indenture theory, the conditional probability and Bayes method in mathmatic-statistics.The basic research frame of full text is as follows:The first chapter of the paper explains the research meaning of the paper, review the relevant Chinese & foreign research achievements and current situations , put forward the research goal and research frame.The second chapter of the paper is the base of the full text studying the form and economic explain of informational asymmetry. On the financial market, the typical informational asymmetry exists between the managers and the outside investors. Therefore the managers' adverse selection or morals hazard problem will be caused. So the studiers must have abundant understanding comparatively to informational asymmetry in order to solve the investment and financing problems well in reality. This chapter describe the reason why informational asymmetry is produced, the display of informational asymmetry and the effect on enterprise finance successively. Finally analyze systemically the reason why informational asymmetry be...