| Since eighties last century, rapid development of international trade, free flow of international capital and world economy integration deepening make every economies in the world more interactive and interdependent. The monetary policy in a country will fast spread over and affect other countries' economy through intra-and inter-capital markets relations. Failure for the countries concerned to cooperate monetary policies each other will result in a bad economic outcome and a net welfare loss. As a result, monetary integration become new system arrangements for interdependent economies to seek common prosperity. On the basis of this, the paper is to focus on the macroeconomic policies coordination from the macro-angle of view. It's core idea is that monetary integration has changed the agents and the environment of policy-making in the European monetary union (EMU), forming a unbalanced framework including a common monetary policy and independent fiscal policies. Obvious difference in economy cycles and economy structure between member states will pose a challenge to common monetary policy. Disagreement in the policy targets such as inflation and output between EBC and member states make common monetary policy and fiscal polices more conflicting, as well as fiscal liberalisms and moral risks due to loss of exchange rate tools and free flow of productivity factors in the EUR area. More spillovers between fiscal polices will lead to more policy conflicts and policy free-riders. The aims of the paper by use of game theory is to analysts the game equilibrium between policy-makers, to discover the solutions to macroeconomic policies coordination and optimize the allocation of policy tools coping with all kinds of economic shocks in order to maintain steady balanced economy growth in the monetary union.The paper consists of seven chapters.Chaper1—IntroductionIn this chapter, we give relative presentations of the paper including research background, methods, outline and structure.Chapter2—Monetary policies coordination in the process of economy integration In this chapter, we try to describe the cause of economy integration. On the basis of this, we aim to prove that policies coordination is a solution to low or negative efficiency in the implement of monetary policies due to international economy interdependence, providing a explanation for the cause of monetary integration.Chapter3—Monetary integration and common central bank In this chapter, we analyse the outcome of common monetary policy affected by different preference for inflation of member states under the majority-vote rule, and explore the rules with common monetary policy is decided in line given difference of economy cycles in member states and the ways in common monetary policy is implemented under conditions of economic structural asymmetries. Chapter4—Bilateral game equilibrium between common central bank and member states In this chapter, we discuss how to coordinate monetary policy and fiscal policy to deal with all kinds of economic shocks. From long term of view, we analyse the importance to restrict member states from fiscal liberalisms and moral risks with a detailed depict of the reality of European union.Chapter5—Multilateral game equilibrium between common bank and member states In this chapter, we describe the conflict and free-rider of the policies between common central bank and member states, discover the optimum mode of multi-players game and analyse the long term economy equilibrium under the game between common central bank and member states.Chapter 6—The game between member states in course of monetary integration In this chapter, we analyse the game outcome between member states in light of the reality of European union, discuss deeply tax competition and tax coordination between member states, and calculate the benefit from fiscal coordination with a empirical test to European monetary union (EMU).Chapter 7—Future ways of reforms in a course of European Economy IntegrationIn this cha...
|
PDF Full Text Request