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Models Of Evading Adverse Selection In Electronic Markets

Posted on:2005-08-15Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:L LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1116360152468548Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Information technology makes the new transaction environment and media, electronic markets, for trade parties. Though the cost of information publishing and obtaining is reduced and the speed of information transmission is quickened in this new markets, adverse selection causing by quality uncertainty of goods and service is more serious than traditional markets. Therefore, it presents an innovational problem of transaction risk management mechanism for network marketing firms and cybermediaries, the transaction platform organizers. Under the background, using information economics, marketing, electronic commerce economics and decision theory and methodology, this research investigates systematically the mechanism of avoiding adverse selection mechanism, decision models and strategies and the decision methods shown as following.(1) The causes of quality information asymmetry in electronic markets and avoiding adverse selection mechanism.At first, this dissertation analyzes the impact of quality information on buyer's purchase decision, and presents the causes of quality information asymmetry in electronic markets to be different from in traditional markets. And then the research establishes the adverse selection model on the base of the assumption that quality and price submit to the normal distribution. The result that adverse selection will have significant effect on the transaction efficiency in electronic markets is gained by model analysis. Finally, the dissertation analyzes the validity of signaling and screening, avoiding adverse selection mechanism from different main body.(2) Marketing signal selection model for network marketing firmsThis dissertation firstly analyzes which signals are appropriate to be used in electronic markets, makes classification of signals according to the cost of signaling, and then describes the characteristic of each kind of signals. Based on the analysis above, the game model of signaling for firms is built in duopoly. The research studies the impacts of signaling cost and the proportion of different consumer on signal selection of the firm through the existence conditions of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium, combining with the properties of the firm, consumers and rivals in electronic markets, and presents the strategies of signaling product quality in different statuses finally. (3) Quality-contingent price signaling model for network marketing firmsDefining market's and firm's quality estimation distribution, this dissertation builds a model of quality-contingent price signaling for network marketing firms with quality-sensitive demand on the purpose of the optimization of expectation benefit per unit time. Then, this research analyzes the existence of the optimal solution from the determining optimal rebate with given price and determining optimal price with given rebate. Through numerical example, the dissertation examines the optimal price signaling strategies for network marketing firms when electronic markets have different estimation of quality, and then discusses the impact of parameters in the model on optimal decision. (4) Adverse selection risk evading model based on cybermediariesThe dissertation firstly describes the mode of electronic commerce enrolled by the cybermediaries, compares transaction risk of electronic commerce with cybermediaries to without cybermediaries, and designs the evading mechanism and builds decision models of transaction risk of cybermediaries from three different perspectives. Then, this research analyzes three models whether the optimal solutions exist respectively and presents the strategies of optimal decision under different parameters. This research compares risk evading operation of three cybermediaries empirically, that is, Alibaba,Yaboo and Eachnet, and verifies the efficiency of decision model and strategies. The measures of adverse selection risk evading are discussed from the quality of product oriented and user oriented, and then the role and applicable trade type of each measure is res...
Keywords/Search Tags:Electronic markets, Information asymmetry, Adverse selection, Network marketing firm, Cybermediary, Signaling, Risk evading
PDF Full Text Request
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