Study On Theory, Methods And Applications On Strategic Alliance For N-persons Cooperative Game Theory

on the background of setting strategic alliance game model, This thesis, employing the syllogism and relative comparison analysis, sets up one set of dynamic coalition game theory and definite two new concepts — competition games and interference games. The main results are as the following.1. Dynamic cooperative game theory is one of the most important three directions in w-persons cooperative games, it's a difficult problem also. We study w-persons dynamic coalition games as a Markov process. Definite the status set of v ( S ), translation matrix and status probability of coalition-S in dynamic coalition games. Denote strategic selection of player i at different time as the selection at time serial set T = { t0 , t1 , ...,tn}. Gave the SK value of player i at each dot in time serial T = { t0 , t1, ...,tn}. Set SK axiom of dynamic cooperative games. Prove the SK value is the only solution in dynamic cooperative games with SK axiom. Talks about the characters of the SK value. Extend the research field of dynamic cooperative games.2. In order to set the models of annexing and recombining between strategic alliances. We proposal the concepts of competition games and their amount transfer in the basis of composition games. Proof the theorems that there are amount transfers and stable sets in competition games. Simply states the difference of the two games in examples: Firstly competition games makes two different games to the same games, composition games makes the different games to play independently. Secondly the amount transfer of competition games comes from outside and composition games from inside. Competition games along with composition games includes all kinds of types in strategic align annex and recombine, this makes the game theory model more perfect.3. From the view of OPEC to control the oil output, we propose the concept of interference games. When v(M)≤ q, q∈R, the game v (S) changes to a new gamesvq— interference games. Proof when q≥v({i}), xi ≥ {[v(M)]/q}v({i}), the stable set ofvq is existent, vqis stable, when q< v({i}), the payoff of vq isn't existent, this makes its stable set inexistent also. vq isn't stable.