Rawls' Public Reason Thoughts,

The problem of stability is the focus of Rawls' thoughts about political philosophy, because Rawls think that the problem of stability is fundamental to political philosophy. Rawls present and explicate systematically the conception of public reason in his work Political Liberalism. The main question driving Political Liberalism is that of how it could be possible for citizens to achieve consensus on a single conception of political justice under conditions of reasonable pluralism. Just because there exist all kinds of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in a modern democratic society, so no one of these doctrines could be affirmed by all citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of these doctrines, or some other reasonable doctrines, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. In Rawls' opinion, we are to recognize the practical impossibility of reaching reasonable comprehensive doctrines, especially an agreement that might serve the political purpose of achieving peace and concord in a society characterized by religious and philosophical differences. To Rawls, the limited scope of this conclusion is of special importance and he think a constitutional regime does not require an agreement on a comprehensive doctrine: the basis of its social unity lies elsewhere. Rawls adopt, then, a constructivist view to specify the fair terms of social cooperation as given by the principles of justice agreed to by the representatives of free and equal citizens when fairly situated. The bases of this view lie in fundamental ideas of the public political culture as well as citizens' shared principles and conceptions of practical reason. So Rawls regard his principles of justice as a political, not a metaphysical conception.Public reason is a shared political reason by all citizens in a modern democratic society. Only when citizens comply with the restriction of public reason in public political activity, can they justify their political actions. Just as Rawls point out, when all citizens understand and accept the political principles of justice from their own comprehensive doctrines, then public reason will become the most reasonable basis for the stability of modern democratic society. More importantly, Rawls make a difference between a modus Vivendi and an overlapping consensus. When we think of social consensus founded on self- or group interests, or on the outcome of political bargaining: social unity is only apparent, as its stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the fortunate convergence of interests. An overlapping consensus, therefore, is not merely a consensus on accepting certain authorities, or on complying with certain institutional arrangements, founded on a convergence of self- or group interests. All those who affirm the political conception start from their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical, and moral grounds it provides. This feature of stability highlights a basic contrast between an overlapping consensus and a modus Vivendi, the stability of which does depend on happenstance and a balance of relative forces. This means that those who affirm the various views supporting the political conception will not withdraw their support of it should the relative strength of their view in society increase and eventually become dominant. Individuals will continue to endorse the liberal order regardless of the balance of power among contending comprehensive doctrines. In this way, political stability is possible under conditions of pluralism. Since only a freestanding liberalism can win an overlapping consensus, only a freestanding liberalism can be stable.In these endeavors, too, citizens confront the obstacles to agreement posed by the fact of reasonable pluralism. Hence Rawls proposed a mode of public political discourse in which citizens conduct their fundamental discussions within the framework of what each regards as a political conception of justice based on values that the others can reasonably be expected to endorse. In public political discussion, then, citizens should be ready to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality. This means that, as in political justification generally, citizens are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines in properly public discussion.In Rawls' interpretation about public reason, public reason mainly means the duty of civility and the ideal of democratic citizenship. What Rawls really want to present is the importance of the standard of reciprocity in public political discourse. In other word, public reason places restrictions on the agenda and the vocabulary of democratic deliberation. The question remains us to think is that any constitutional democracy can sustain conscientious support if it tells its citizens that they cannot rightly say what they believe as part of democratic public dialogue.