Governance Through The Stock Option Incentive Contract Within Chinese Listed Companies

Governance through the Stock Option Incentive Contract (GSOIC)is a sort of remuneration governance belongs to the corporate contractual governance, which aimed at coordinating the principle-agent problem as an equity incentive contractual governance given to the management. By contracting with each other, both of the contractors agree to the contractual allocation of the quasi-rent and are volunteered to accept the contractual governance by contracting.The nature of GSOIC, is supposed to be a mutual governance between the principle and the agent, within a specific period in future, and some where, company as a example. During the mutual strategy game between the contractors can they confirm their capacity borders, that means, GSOIC is a kind of dynamical relationship governance through incomplete incentive contract (ⅡC) But in fact, the GSOIC is designed and used as a complete contract, which can help the principle to incentive and constraint the agents to behave with a same interest expectation.That is why this dissertation analysis reconstructing the theoretical basis and theoretical analysis framework of GSOIC on the IIC and on the nature of human's developing. The model about governance path is going to be tested by both of the empirical methods and the simulation methods.The structure is as follows.There are 7 chapters belong to 4 steps on research. Chapter 1 and 2 are as the first step of this dissertation to show the necessity of the topic. Chapter 3 and 4 are for the second step to study the possibility of the topic. Chapter 5and 6 are contribute to step 3 by empirical test and simulation test. Chapter 7 is the final step as conclusions.Chapter 1 is Introduction. By comparing GSOIC's developing in the U.S. and China, considering what exactly can GSOIC be? What kind of GSOIC suits Chinese listed companies? Give out the research objective, content and structure, and technology ideas and research methods.Chapter 2 is Review. Part one, to clarify the main outline of literatures; part two, review on the focus of literatures:target, mechanism and path. During which comes out this dissertation's perspective, the incomplete incentive contract theory.Chapter 3 is the theoretical basis. According to the nature, mechanism and object of IIC, analysis the theoretical basis's logic and deduce that, there is a cross-disciplinary, mutually articulated dealing, built by the Contract Theory, the Organizational motivation theory, the Management Control Theory and the Behavioral Theory.Chapter 4 is the theoretical analysis framework. Discuses the possibility of this framework at first, then reconstructs GSOIC's theoretical analysis framework by five dimensions based on the ICC and the true intention of human's behaves.Chapter 5 is the empirical study. Choose 122 Chinese listed companies which announced to implement SOIC as a total study sample. There is a preliminary judging by a general description of statistical analysis. There comes a judgement on the contractual conflicts of those listed company by multiple regression test and by event study, there comes a judgement about the status of GSOIC practiced in China.Chapter 6 is simulation study. Design and test the GSOIC's path by contractual deduce and by simulation, aimed at an; effective path for Chinese listed company.Chapter 7 is conclusions and future.The contributions of theoretical study is reconstructing GSOIC's theoretical analysis framework. Here are the key points:The aim of GSOIC is divided into two parts of primary contractual governance and the ultimate contractual governance. The former is to coordinate conflicts of interests based on desiring for the economical capability. The latter is to coordinate conflicts of developing expectation based on desiring for moral capability. The former can realize economic freedom by governance interests with interests, while the latter one can realize specific freedom by governance interests with moral.According to contract model GHM and TCE, and the governance timing schedule, this dissertation reconstructs the mechanism of GSOIC. By inspiring the moral law inside, can SOIC control the uncertainty and find the order emerge from individuals behave's order.Accompany to the contractors'characteristics changed as, "reasoned behave for the greatest self-interest→bounded rationality behave for limited self-interest→freedom of choice and fair society's preference for reciprocal altruism→…" GSOIC appears "tragedy of the commons quasi-rent→unstable quasi-rent→marginal increased quasi-rent". So can this dissertation reconstruct the path of GSOIC as "competition impulse self-enforcement to realize cooperate→third-party-enforcement to ensure cooperation→altruistic punishment impulse strong reciprocity to maintain cooperation→negative cooperate hold by the quit mechanism, positive cooperate hold by the renegotiation mechanism". By building a framework of opportunistic behavioural analysis, push out the path as self-motivated self-enforcement, which appears a mutual balance among contractors with different behavior strategies.Analysis, reconstruction and empirical study on the GSOIC based on the IIC, focus on a path for Chinese listed company, during which can those compaies realize the ultimate target of GSOIC. The perfect expectation is to fulfil the contractor's desire for economic capability and moral capability as a natural being. What is more, strategy game among the contractors with different behavior preferences will come forth a good order for group behave, which can fulfil the contractor's desire for a higher level balance of dynamical governance as a corporation, during which can explore its capability. All of those help realize the substantive freedom for both of the contractors, then there comes the win-win developing.