Design And Implementation Mechanism Of Restrict Stock Option Incentive Contract

The separation of two rights in modern enterprises caused the emergence of agency cost,which is one of the important issues extensively discussed during the process of corporate governance.As a method that can properly solve subject of agency,stock option incentive is successfully applied to western enterprises;however,due to the specificity of capital market,imperfect manager market and shortage of guidance by relevant policies,the stock option incentive contract in Chinese enterprises usually contain severe following like sheep and unreasonable contract formulation,which triggered direction deviation of stock option incentive and undesirable market reaction.Based on large quantity of empirical researches on current stock option incentive implemented by Chinese enterprises,Chinese scholars discovered that,except for external factors,it is enterprise internal factors that lead the stock option incentive implemented by Chinese enterprises cannot authentically play incentive function.The actual controller in enterprises turned stock option incentive into the tool distributing welfare to senior managers out of blind selection of contract elements.Under this situation,instead of enjoying the bonus brought by stock option incentive,the minority shareholders need to undertake the cost of such welfare,which intensified subject of agency.After comparing the contracts of five corporations,including Beijing Soft Rock Investment Group,that proposed to grant restricted stock to senior managers at the price of zero Yuan,it is found that,there are many differences between the contract of Beijing Soft Rock Investment and the other four corporations.Then,this paper analyzes the related factors which may affect the implementation of equity incentive process,and on the basis of the theory of contract if reasonable theory to launch equity incentive effects of listed company.The analysis and evaluation of exercise conditions,baseline performance and validity period in 2016 Beijing Soft Rock Investment Group restricted stock incentive contract aimed at senior managers showed that,the possible derivation during the process of formulating stock incentive solution caused the failure of reaching incentive effect with emerging welfare-type tendency.On the promise of unscientific formulation of stock incentive contract,the influence of stock incentive started with calculating window period CAR value based on draft issuance and gap of internal salary was implemented.At last,from the perspectives of before proposing stock incentive solution,during the process of formulating stock incentive solution,implementing stock incentive solution,and setting feedback mechanism,this paper provided effective measures for optimizing listed companies' implementation of restricted stock incentive plan with the expectation of offering reference to implement restricted stock incentive plan on listed companies in the future.