Study On The Behavior Of Route Choice And The Coordination Method Under Guidance Condition

The dissertation studies on several problems, such as route choice, traffic guidance information, equilibrium models and the correlation between traffic control & guidance. First, individual travel behavior is discussed mainly by several game models without traffic information. Then we research in the effectiveness of traffic information, the algorithm for computing dynamic guidance route and the interactive process between manager and travelers. What's more, the expected travel state is given by equilibrium models in manager-perspective. Finally, a new method of the correlation between traffic control and guidance is presented. Specifically, the main contents and the innovations of the dissertation are summarized as follows:(1) We model complete information games of travel problem when all the travelers are assumed to be rationality completely, and give the corresponding algorithms using Matlab for its advantage on solving some large-scale problems. Further, a new method is given by another perspective.(2) Under the assumption of travelers with bounded rationality, we apply the improved discrete best response dynamics & the continuous replicator dynamics travel model to travel problem and obtain a method to determine evolutionarily stable strategy. Next, in order to reflect the actual situation better, the random perturbation is added to each traveler's payoff function, consequently, the stochastic fictitious play learning processes based on pure and mixed strategy are given respectively. At last, we make a comparison and analysis among all the travel models from another perspective that every route is considered to a player.(3) It presents the necessary and sufficient conditions of User Equilibrium and Logit Equilibrium with traffic information release under the assumption that all the route cost functions are nonlinear. Then the effectiveness of traffic information is discussed and the corresponding theorems are concluded. What's more, the algorithm for one kind of traffic information which is closer to reality, the dynamic guidance route, is discussed.(4) In order to study on the travelers'reactive behavior facing with guidance information, we construct the guidance-travel signaling game model and discuss all the perfect Bayesian equilibriums which can be applied to divide the road congestion classes. At last, we design various fictitious play learning processes based on different game models and discuss their convergence property so that the interactive process between the traffic manager's providing guidance information and travelers'route choice can be reflected better.(5) In order to obtain the expected and perfect travel results for manager, one new method of the Logit route choice model, Dial's loading in batches algorithm, is presented in Chapter 5, whose advantage is that path enumeration is not required. What's more, a new dimension-reduced method of sensitivity analysis for perturbed stochastic user equilibrium assignment (SUEA) model with smaller dimension is given.(6) At last, we conclude a new method of the correlation between traffic control & guidance based on maximum flow, and introduce the way to discuss the boundary of correlation, the coordination strategies and evaluation criterion detailedly. Further, four classes of simulation experiment is carried out to validate feasibility of the method.