Supply Network Optimization Based On Coordination Mechanism Design Considering Diverse Chain Structures

Accordingly with highly integrated industry chain evolving to be newly multi- dimensionally dispersed, it has gradually become one of the hottest research topics in both academia and industry that how to achieve supply chain cooordination(SCC) and obtain global optimization of the networks in a decentralized-decision situation for improving performance and enhancing profitability of the supply chain. Although there exists a lot of research done in the field of SCC, it's obvious that the SCC and optimization problems on some specified supply chain structure are still open. In this thesis, we mainly study how to make SCC mechanism design and supply network optimizaiton for diverse specified supply chain structure with the research results and inovations as follows:(1) With a bargaining power unblanced supply chain structure consisting of many suppliers approximating competely competitive market and several monopolistic channel retailers, we model and analyse this structure in static and dynamic pricing games respectively to get the equilibria, upon which we obtain the fundamental conditions for mechanism design of the exogenrous force to get pareto improvement of the system payoff, and then the empact domain and constraints of this exogenous forces are interpreted exploiting Rubistein bargaining game.(2) Fousing on the general two-stage supply chain structure frequently described by dynamic game, we devise a complete mothedology of side-payment self-enforcing contract (SSEC) design, which enable the original game to evolve to a new dynamic game. SSEC design stimulates every participant in the decentralized-decision situation behaves in a way optimizing individual payoff, but surprisely achieving a collective-rational effect. It naturally meets principles of incetive compatibility, participation constraints and self-enforced stability, which enrich the supply chain coordination mechanism design theory.(3) On a triple-echelon supply chain structure comprising a risk-neutral supplier, a risk-averse distributor and a risk-neutral retailer, we refine and model this supply transaction process considering simultaneously the risk constraints and pricing dependent demand sensitivity, and design a new contract to get chain wide coordination preconditioning satisfactions of risk constraint and global optimization.(4) Considering a multi-echelon supply chain structure with innovative products, we exploit the tool of stochastic optimal control to model the problem of minimizing long run average system operation cost. Further we provide an optimal inventory and transportation control policy clearly defined by several parameters, which can optimize the total operational cost when the multi-echelon supply chain is suffering demand fluctuation and volatility. What's more, we also utilize coalitional game and fuzzy coalitional game to analyze and prove the stability of coalition and fuzzy coalition in deterministic and fuzzy environment, respectively, depending on which we also conjecture the cost allocation in both coalition and fuzzy coalition.(5) For a supply chain structure possessing special demand correlations among different participants, we sort the product demand into independent demand for inter-network and intra-network, and intermediate demand which can be combined to an input-output matrix. We further model a single-horizon and a multiple period input-output relationships to grasp the dynamics of inventories in the network subject to stochastically independent demands. Finally, we give out a jointly optimal policy to monitor inventory levels systematically and locally by making use of the n dimensional K -convexity in finite horizons.