Research On Stronger Retailers' Buyer Power Abuse In View Of Bounded Rationality

In the retailer dominated supply chain, the stronger retailers in the downstream always transfer the cost and risk to the suppliers in the upstream by their stronger buyer power. It results in the fierce conflicts between the retailers and suppliers, which make the whole supply chain have difficult to realize Pareto equilibrium.Meanwhile, the complexity of market makes supply chain members'bounded rationality nonnegligible. Focusing on the above problem, we study the use of stronger retailers'buyer power on the following items in turn and offer proposals to make Pareto improvement to this type of supply chain.1. Firstly, we study the influence of stronger retailer's batch price depression by his strong buyer power on supply chain performance. By the decision models of suppliers and retailers in perfect and bounded rationality perspective, we get the performance difference of each side on the whole supply chain between the background of retailers'batch price depression and fair exchange. The results show that stronger retailers'buyer power abuse will have negative effect on the supply chain performance eventually.2. Then taking the supply chain consisting of many perfect competitive suppliers and two oligarch competitive retailers as the research object, we study the influence of oligopoly competition on the behavior of retailers'buyer power abuse in evolutionary game theory. By investigating the operation mechanism of retailers'trading behavior to suppliers (transferring or not transferring cost) under Bertrand monopoly competitive model and Stackelberg monopoly competitive model respectively, we get oligopoly retailers'evolutionary stable strategy. The results show that competition can't eliminate completely stronger retailers'buyer power abuse.3. On this basis, taking the more common supply chain consisting of many monopolistic competitive suppliers and two oligarch competitive retailers as the research object, we investigate how suppliers'bargaining power affect stronger retailer's buyer power abuse and get the evolutionary stable strategy of retailer's transaction behavior to suppliers. The results show that suppliers'stronger bargaining power an higher transaction and risk cost which are induced by the strategy of retailer's transferring cost to suppliers can help to eliminate retailer's buyer power abuse. This conclusion gives exerting point for the Pareto improvement of this type of supply chain.4. On the above study basis, we furtherly investigate the influencing factors of suppliers'bargaining power and the effect mechanism by game model and principal-agent model. It reveals that suppliers'bargaining power is a decreaing function of their switching cost which affects suppliers'bargaining power by supply chain members'market share, suppliers'information, study ability and degrees of tolerance.5. At last, targeting at supply chain members'synergy behavior, we use transaction cost theory to study the mechanism of the supply chain synergy in the view of value structure. The findings suggest that correct cooperative strategy, appropriate distribution of relationship rents, mutual trust and commitment help the supply chain achieve synergy, which give theoretical guidance to the Pareto improvement of retailer dominated supply chain.