Study On Pricing And Inventory Decision Models In Supply Chains With Behavioral Factors Consideration

With the development of manufacturing technology and fierce competion outside, the lifecycle of products are becoming shorter and shorter. In order to achieve profit maximization, retailers need to manage products'price routine during selling seasons and orderqing quantities effectively. Traditonal supply chain management literatures usually assume exogenous demand, and customers usually don't consider retailers'pricing mechanism when making purchase decisions. But the research on behavioral science shows that customers may strategically time their purchase according to retailers'pricing mechanism. Furthermore, traditional supply chain management literatures usually assume that supply chain members are risk neutral and rational decision-makers to pursue monetary payoff maximization. Whereas recent behavioral science researches reveal that decision-makers may be risk averse in order to conteract outside uncertainty and risk. To establish positive and stable partnership, members maybe concern whether the whole supply chain's profit are allocated between members equitably. The above behavioral factors are not extensively addressed in traditional supply chain management literatures. Therefore, this dissertation considers some behavioral factors in supply chain management models and analyzes the supply chain's optimal decisions with behavioral factors consideration.This dissertation firstly introduces the research background, analyzes the necessities of incorporating behavioral factors into operations management literatures, and then put forward the research topics to be studied.Secondly, this dissertation summarizes and reviews the state-of-art of the operations management literatures that consider behavioral factors at home and abroad.Thirdly, this dissertation examines the supply chain performance analysis and coordination mechanism design problem with strategic customer behavior. Strategic customer behavior and customers'regret utility are incorporated to the traditional supply chain coordination problem. Rational expectation equilibrium is introduced and rational expectation equilibrium solutions are obtained and the impact of quantity commitment on supply chain performance is also analyzed. At last, the revenue sharing contract and the quantity discount contract are designed to achieve supply chain coordination, respectively. And the basic model is extended in several aspects. Fourthly, this dissertation examines the two-period newsvendor model with strategic customer behavior. Strategic customer behavior is incorporated to the traditional two-period newsvendor problem. Rational expectation equilibrium anlaysis is introduced. And the price routine and initial inventory level determined by the retailer can induce customers in two periods to purchase early in order to achieve total profit maximization. Furthermore, the scenario in which the retailer can commit price in advance is analyzed, and the optimal pricing policy with price commitment is also presented.Fifthly, this dissertation examines the multi-product newsvender problem with strategic customers. Strategic customer behavior is incorporated into the traditional multi-product newsvendor model with budget constraint. Rational expectation equilibrium is introduced and the rational expectation equilibrium solutions when the retailer and cunstomers move simutaneouly in a static game are obtained. Furthermore, the impact of quantity committment on the equilibrium quantity and price are analyzed. At last, the properties of the optimal solutions are characterized and solution procedures are also presented.Sixly, this dissertation examines the retailer's optimal dynamic pricing and capacity choice model with strategic customer behavior. It is assumed that strategic customers and myopic customers both appear in the market. The retaier sets different prices for the selling period and clearance period, respectively, and choose capacity to influence customers'purchase behavior. Stragetic customers time their purchase according to the retailer's pricing decision and capacity choice. The retailer's pricing decision with infinite capacity, capacity choice with fixed prices, and pricing decisions with fixed capacity are analyzed, respectively.Seventhly, this dissertation examines the pricing and coordination problem in a supply chain with members'behavior consideration. Firstly, this dissertation examines the pricing decision problem in a two-echolon supply chain with absolute fairness concerns. Supply chain members concern not only monetary payoff, but also whether the supply chain's total profit is allocated between members equitably. It is assumed that the manufacture and the retailer concern fairness, respectively. The optimal pricing decisions for the supply chain and the members'optimal monetary payoff or optimal utility are obtained. Furthermore, the supply chain coordination problem when members'risk attitudes are considered in a one-manufacture-one-retailer supply chain and the concept of VaR is utilized to model members'risk attitude. Revenue sharing contract is introduced to coordinate the supply chain. A coordination model when members'risk attitude is considered with VaR constraint is established. The ranges of the parameters of the revenue sharing contract under different scenarios are also obtained.Finally, the dissertation concludes the research and proposes future research topics.