Font Size: a A A

Research On Supply Chain Decision And Coordination Mechanism Considering Channel Power In The Context Of Fairness Concern

Posted on:2019-04-30Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z B CuiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330572495738Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
For a long time,oligarchy has played an important role in its industry,such as Qualcomm,Wal-Mart and so on.These enterprises have enormous influence,have strong bargaining power in cooperation with upstream and downstream enterprises,firmly grasp the initiative,which is very easy to lead to monopoly,price increases,excessive squeeze upstream and downstream enterprises profit margins and other issues.In recent years,the rapid development of Behavioral Operations Management(BOM)related research shows that people are not only rational economic people,people’s decision-making will be affected by individual decision bias and social preferences.These common irrational factors are overconfidence,loss aversion,altruism,fairness concerns and so on.The establishment and maintenance of supply chain collaboration is based on win-win cooperation and mutual benefit.Once the strong enterprises in the supply chain abuse their market dominance and squeeze the interests of upstream and downstream partners,this will cause a strong sense of unfairness among vulnerable enterprises,and become the fuse of vulnerable enterprises’ resistance,cooperation friction,and even supply chain conflict.Therefore,the study of Supply Chain Considering the structure of channel rights in the context of fairness concern plays an important role in maintaining the stability of supply chain cooperation,avoiding supply chain conflicts and improving cooperation efficiency.In this paper,the utility function is used to characterize the psychology of fairness concern,and the Stackelberg game model is used to explore the process and results of game and decision-making among enterprises in six different situations.This paper also considers the stakeholder factors in the supply chain,and studies the impact of the game between strong and weak enterprises on stakeholders.In addition,this paper also explores the distribution and coordination of supply chain profits by using revenue sharing contract under the fairness concern.By means of mathematical modeling and numerical simulation,this paper finds that fairness concern psychology may make a profit for itself,but whether the retailer is strong or the manufacturer is strong,fairness concern psychology can not guarantee the manufacturer and the retailer to profit from it at the same time.Stakeholders’ profits always suffer losses when others are concerned about fairness.Fairness concern can not make the supply chain coordinated,and even increase the difficulty of coordination.The revenue sharing contract can achieve good coordination effect,and can effectively achieve the consistency of profit and utility of supply chain members.When the conditions are appropriate,the revenue sharing contract can make all parties more profitable,make the total order quantity of the supply chain reach the theoretical maximum,and achieve the supply chain coordination goal.Finally,this paper summarizes the research results of the full text,and provides relevant enlightenment and suggestions for theoretical research and management practice.In addition,this paper also reflects on the shortcomings of this paper,and puts forward the corresponding improvement methods and possible future research directions.
Keywords/Search Tags:fairness concern, channel rights structure, supply chain, revenue sharing contracts
PDF Full Text Request
Related items