The Models And Empirical Researches On Using Patents As Loan Collateral

With the arising of knowledge economy, the technology-based Small and Medium-sized Enterprises have been the main carrier of technological innovation and important engine for economic development in China. At the same time, the difficulties of financing have been one of the factors restricting the technological small and medium-sized enterprises'further development. Patent pledge loan has been a creative settlement for SMEs'financing problem. However, using patents in securing financing developed slowly in our country. The patent pledge financing is still in its infancy and has not exploited its advantages to the full. For this reason, the relative government departments have put forward a series of policies to support and promote the rapid and healthy growth of patent pledge financing. Therefore, new theoretical research tasks for the field of finance have been raised. Up till now, both theoretical and empirical researches on financing with patent as collateral are sparse and lack of systematicness. Under this background, this paper try to establish a theoretical model for patent pledge financing, and dig out the reason of its slow development, and provide solutions to the problems being found. These researches should be beneficial to mitigate the SMEs'financing difficulties, and have important effects on the advancement of our social economy. Therefore, the researches in this paper have important academic and practical significances.In this paper, we analyze the current situation of patent pledge financing in our country and conclude the distinctive features in the patent securing credit market, then construct the option-based model for patent pledge financing under multi-uncertainties. The equilibrium contract under complete information presents three characters:small loan scale, high interest rate and short loan term. The key factors effecting loan contract is identified. The uncertainty of patent value is the critical factor in determining the feasibility of patent pledge loan. The existence of legal risk will significantly increase the cost of financing with patent as collateral. Enhancing liquidity of technology market can improve the development of patent securing financing obviously. Under asymmetric information, we examine the contract designing by bank to screen enterprises with different types of risks. Combining the loan amount with interest rate as screening tool, the bank can separate low risk enterprises from high risk ones successfully. Therefore, designing and providing diversified contracts to enterprise can alleviate asymmetric information and may solve credit rationing in patent securing credit market. With the application of the basic model, we discuss the efficiency of the risk compensation policies at present:interest subsidizing and loss compensation, examine the intrinsic reasons in unsatisfied policies effect, and propose the improvement suggestions. Moreover, we explore the feasibility and efficiency of innovative modes in patent pledge financing, and study the features and applied scopes of these new modes. Introducing amortization into patent pledge loan is proved be unsuitable. Allowing the enterprise to transfer collateral patents and prepay loan first could significantly increase both the bank's and the enterprise's profits at the same time. Enterprises credit alliance acts as the mechanism of developing the superior and weeding out the inferior, and the bank's enthusiasm of lending enhances to a great extent. Furthermore, we make use of empirical analyses to study the operating mechanism of patent pledge loan, and examine the scientific characters and feasibility of the theoretical model of patent pledge financing. Patent inherent attributes remain important to determine patent collateral value. Firm specific characters could reveal risk level and have significant effect on credit amount. Pledging patents as collateral can lighten the information asymmetry and increase the credit line, and may mitigate the credit rationing problem in SMEs credit market.