Research On Influencing Factors And Economic Consequences Of Patent Pledge Loan

The rise of knowledge economy makes patents surpass traditional capital such as tangible assets and become an important driving force of world economic development in the 21st century.At the same time,patents have become an important asset to support the development of the company.However,due to the risk-averse characteristics of the credit market,on the one hand,high-tech enterprises have a large number of patents,on the other hand,high-tech enterprises have high financial constrain.Since 2008,the Chinese government has issued a series of policies to promote the development of patent pledge loan.By 2017,the number of patent pledge in China has reached 14,000,and the total financing has reached 72 billion yuan.On the one hand,promoting the innovation of patent-based financing channels can stimulate enterprises' R&D and innovation,thus promoting the national economic growth.On the other hand,it can provide much-needed funds for the development of high-tech enterprises and increase financing capacity.This dissertation manually collects the data of all disclosed mortgage loans of listed companies and all patent citations of listed companies.Using patent collateral loans granted to Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 as main sample,this dissertation investigates these topics:First,does the patent value affect the availability of patent pledge loan?Second,how does the value of pledged patent influence the loan size and loan maturity of patent collateral loan?Third,how market react to patent collateral loan behavior?Does patent collateral loan improve the long-term performance of enterprises?Fourth,does the acquisition of patent collateral loan alleviate the financial constraint and how to affect the enterprise innovation activity?This dissertation finds that:First,high patent value can not only alleviate the default risk of patent pledge loan,but also reduce the cost of advance screening of bank's decision,so patent value is positively related to the probability of using patents as loan collateral.,this phenomenon occurs in the group of non-state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned banks.Additionally,we found that the larger number of patents,the higher citation of patents,the larger the loan amounts and the longer the loan maturity,this phenomenon occurs in the group of non-state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned banks.Furthermore,the larger number of patents,the higher citation of patents,the lower the loan interest.We also find that banks tend to issue larger amounts of loans,more long-term loans and new loans to companies with patent collateral loans than companies with non-collateral loans.Second,firms disclosing patent pledge loans have significantly higher incrementally cumulative abnormal return in the post-period than those that not disclosing patent pledge loans.Additionally,firms which have patent pledge loans have significantly higher long-term performance in the post-period than those that not have patent pledge loans.This phenomenon occurs in the group of higher local IP rights enforcement,high external finance and non-state-owned enterprises.Third,taking the patent pledge loan pilot as the background,we discuss the effect of patent pledge loan on enterprise financing constraints and innovation activities by using DID method.The results show that the patent pledge pilot can alleviate the financing constraints of enterprises and encourage enterprises to make substantial innovation.Additionally,we find that the influence of patent pledge loan on enterprise behavior is more significant in sub-samples of private enterprises,regions with high dependence on external financing and high protection of intellectual property rights.Furthermore,we found that the positive association between the companies'R&D investment(patent output or patent quality)and TFP increases with using patent collateral loan.The main contributions include:First of all,from the perspective of debt financing,this dissertation examines that the number of enterprise patents and patent citation can significantly improve the possibility of enterprises obtaining patent pledge loans,as well as higher loan size and longer loan maturity,enriching the literature on the consequences of enterprise innovation.Secondly,because of low collateral value,high risk and future earnings are difficult to determine,patents are more difficult to use a collateral.Therefore,most literature examines the role of patent for shareholders,the conclusion of this dissertation show that patent can also enhance the value of the company through the creditors.Thirdly,the financial intermediary theory shows that the most important function of banks is through monitoring(including the loan screening and monitoring)to reduce the information asymmetry,so companies get loans will send a positive signal to the public,the existing domestic announcement on bank lending reaction were found that investors have a negative reaction of bank loans,but these studies do not focus on the types of loans.This dissertation focuses on the patent collateral loan and finds that the announcement of patent collateral loan can bring a positive market,which indicates that patent collateral loan can send a positive signal to investors in China.This dissertation contributes to the literature of the market reaction of bank loan.Fourth,under the background of weak creditor protection in China,this paper finds that patent pledge loans can relieve financing constraints and improve enterprise innovation performance,providing empirical evidence for better understanding how patent pledge loans enhance firm value in the context of weak creditor protection.It complements the relationship between bank credit and enterprise innovation.Finally,on July 21,2018,MOF issued the "regulations on intellectual property related accounting information disclosure(draft)",on November 15,they issued "regulations on intellectual property related accounting information disclosure".This dissertation main findings have certain theoretical support and reference significance for this regulation,and have certain guiding role for the bank credit decision after the implementation of this regulation in the future.