Study On The Control Of Non-public Expropriation Of Rural Land

The non-public expropriation on rural land has serious negative effect on China's economic and social development. Therefore, striking in-depth research on the background and cause of this problem, analyzing relevant main bodies'behavior, summarizing all sorts of post effects and results and exploring the path and measures of management and control are theoretically and practically meaningful for scientific allocation and utilization of China's land resource, equal distribution of land wealth and buffering contradiction caused by land acquisition.1. Key Points of the Research.(1) Analysis on the motivation of rural land over-expropriation and features of rural land expropriation. This thesis analyzes the inter-connection and vague cross-border of public construction land and non-public construction land from the perspective of public interest benefit, studies the features of rural land expropriation from the perspective of public choice theory. Through research on China's rural land system and land expropriation system, this thesis seeks to find the reason for the realization of over-expropriation on rural land and the local government's incentives for over-expropriation from the perspective of financial power decentralization system.(2) Synthesized effect analysis on the forced expropriation on rural land. Based on market equilibrium and research data as well as macro based data, this thesis analyzes the short-term effect of land research allocation, distributing effect among urban city and rural region, agricultural production and non-agricultural production that cause by local government's non-public land expropriation. Moreover, we give measurement on the loss of rural land, waste of non-agriculturally productive rural land and county construction land. Then, we study the re-distributing effect that caused by non-public land expropriation among rural citizen, government and firms, and argue that the marginalisation of rural citizen, the formation and escalation of contradictive relationship between rural citizen and local government along with land user were definitely caused by forced land expropriation and low compensation for it. (3) Research on the main bodies'behavior of non-public expropriation of rural land. Under the background of current relationship situation of employer and farmer as well as urban city and rural region in China, this thesis analyzes the features of speculation and profitability behavior of land user, resistance behavior of rural citizen and community and local government's forced non-public land expropriation. And then, we give in-depth gaming analysis on the relationship among local government, central government, expropriated rural citizen and land users. Based on all above, this thesiss proposes the fundamental framework of inhibiting land expropriate incentives of local government, explores the strategic adapting direction of central government's development, substitution path of local government's land finance power and motivating factors of substitution. In order to constrain the behavior of industrial production-oriented land offering with low pricing from local government and high pricing behavior for business-oriented construction, this thesis discusses the perception, supervision and punishment of speculation behavior of land users, and we study the perception and constraining method of short-term-orientation behavior and rent seeking behavior of rural officials.(4) Research on quantitative control of non-public expropriation of rural land. This thesis analyzes the performance and reasons of dis-coordination between land utilization plan system and urban plan system, and also analyzes the quantitative control method for non-public land expropriation by harmonizing the two systems. To improve the thoughts framework, we study the reason for the dysfunction of constraining system of basic rural land protecting policy on non-public land expropriation. Furthermore, this thesis also studies the executive feature of different industrial construction land standard as well as current standard of non-public land utilization project and analyzes the improving space of current standard. Then, we re-discuss current standard of expropriation compensation and its contradiction, gives analysis on how to scientifically produce the compensation standard and control of non-public land expropriation.(5) Research on the procedure control of non-public expropriation of rural land. Under the constraining of community ownership of rural land as well as the power disjunction between ownership and operation, this thesis explores the methods for rural citizen to participate the decision and pricing procedure of land expropriation, studies the way to realize control of non-public land expropriation and improve approving system though rethinking on approving system of rural land transfer and acquisition, analyzes the supervision form of the procedure of non-public land expropriation.(6) Research on the control measures of non-public expropriation of rural land. This thesis explores the objectives, procedure and incentives of role transferring of government in non-public land expropriation, analyzes the feature of non-public construction land market, market forming condition and supervision measures of non-public land expropriation market, explores the path and way of scientific allocation of the benefit caused by land value increasing among nation, community and rural citizen, studies the measures of procedure control and payment control of benefit caused by land value increasing.(7) Policy implication on the control of non-public expropriation of rural land.2. Findings.(1) Systematical drawbacks are the fundamental reason for over-expropriation of rural land. For one thing, there is imbalance in financial power and operating power between central government and local government, and this is caused by the current system of financial power decentralization. Therefore, the unhealthy competition that inducted by performance-oriented system motivates the behavior of over-expropriation on rural land by local government. For the other, the dual-system of between rural and urban region in land utilization and rural land ownership as well as the common interest in expropriation procedure are all in vague space and low entry standard, and this provides government's expropriation behavior with flexible choices. Both sides offer chances for over-expropriation on rural land.(2) Serious problem caused by over-expropriation of rural land. There will be food security risk caused by the decreasing of agricultural land. Rural citizen who lost their land resource and wealth would be marginalized. This would escalate their contradiction with government as well as social contradiction, and then activate risks like social instability and accountability-free of local government. The dependence on land finance of local government and stubbornness for economic growth would grow local debt risk. Over non-agriculturalization, urbanization of rural land and short-term allocation system of land resource, wasting behavior and utilization with low efficiency of county construction land and non-agricultural industry would bring about the insustainability risk of land resource utilization.(3) System transferring measures can basically solve the contradiction in non-public expropriation of rural land. It is necessary for central government to discard low cost developmental strategy in order to realize the transformation from investment-oriented government to service-oriented government, to weaken the economic growth factor in performance assessment of local government while strengthen social development factor. Only this can positively change the irrational competition among local governments. Improving existing decentralized system of financial power and strengthening the supplying responsibility of public goods from local government to society could effectively avoid the over-dependence on land finance of local government and weaken the incentives of land expropriation from local government. Strengthening the usufructuary right of farmers on rural land and clarifying the public interest scale in land expropriation could effectively inhibit the behavior of non-public land expropriation, Increasing the compensation for those farmers who lost rural land and offering them with equal treat as urban citizen shared could increase the entry level of land expropriation and control the quantity of non-public land expropriation.(4) There is in need of transitional measures to conduct market reform of non-public expropriation of rural land. Government could firstly try to abandon the pricing power in land expropriation, and then to gradually give away the expropriating right of non-public construction land when time is right, which is beneficial for the progressive institutional change from forced expropriation to market-oriented transformation. The operation of non-public land transferring market should built on the basis of clear usufructuary right of farmers on rural land and clear trading rules as well as supervising rules.(5) Constant improving existing planning system, basic farm land protecting system and land standard of urban construction utilization could realize the efficient quantitative control on the non-public expropriation of rural land. Based on the national economic growth and the guidance system of land utilization plan on urban construction plan can realize the coordination of the two plans, and this could improve the scientific level and authority of planning system and make up to the disjunction between the two plans. Swift construction of the basic farm land protection system and compensation system could improve the initiatives of the protection from government. Standards of urban construction land per capita and industrial project construction standards must be strictly taken into action and the standards of urban residential land can be properly increased. (6) Offering the decision making right in participating into land expropriation, optimizing the approval procedure in land expropriation and strengthening the process supervision are beneficial for the procedure control in non-public rural land expropriation. Providing rural citizen with position of major participator in land expropriation and offering them with the right in land planning, expropriating decision making and its execution are also good for the equality making in non-public expropriation. Separating existing approving system of rural transfer and expropriation, strictly limiting the flexible decision right space in approval and improving the quality of procedure supervision with help of modern technology could standardize the expropriation procedure.3. Innovation Points.(1) Based on the gradual institution change, this thesis originally argues that transitional measures are necessary for the market reform of non-public expropriation on rural land. Before the completion of the market reform of non-public expropriation on rural land, existing system and institutions should be improved in order to conduct effective control of non-public land expropriation(2) There are two steps for the market reform of non-public expropriation on rural land. Government should firstly abandon the pricing right in expropriation and offer farmers with the right of price negotiating. Government could give away the forced expropriation right on non-public utilization land after the clarification of the public interests in rural land expropriation and the escalation of the usufructuary right of farmers on rural land. Then, the transferring process from rural land to non-public construction land can be achieved by market and fanner can initiate the equal negotiation on land operation right with land users while government could be responsible for regulation on the market supervision and execution system of utilization of land and land planning.(3) The benefit caused by land value increasing neither belongs neither to government nor to farmers, and it should be shared. Those rural citizens who lost land should share the level which should be guaranteed the their life and development level is not lower than the average area of urban residents living and the level of protection. Public shares could be managed by government in order to assure rural development while realizing scientific allocation among local governments.4. Implications and future research agenda. (1) Further development and researches are needed in the direction and path for financial power decentralization system, evaluation index system of local government at all levels and index weighting methodology under the premise of different functional areas.(2) Further exploration on the clear definition of ownership bodies of rural economic community and collective capitals, the clear definition of concrete responsibility, obligation and rights of community members, the form and measures of description for membership are all strongly needed.(3) There is in need of specific research on the institutional design of market reform of rural community land using on the operational level.(4) Future specific research on the public and private shares proportion of benefit caused by land value increasing, and allocating system as well managing system among local governments are also in need.