Study On The Mechanism Of Employee's On-job -training Based On Game Theory

On-the-job training of employees is one of the most important modes to form the human capital, containing two types of training: the general on-the-job training and the specific on-the-job training. Under the labour market of complete competition, commonly, in terms of the training cost, the employees are supposed to take on it because they entirely obtain the return of the general on-the-job training; whereas, all the cost of the specific on-the-job training would be accepted by an enterprise because of the return of such training. However, there is a wonder about why in reality an enterprise has still taken the mode of the general on-the-job training for the employees. This is one hot focus for the present theoretical study of on-the-job training of employees. While the comparison of the institution analysis on the on-the-job training of employees has become another hot focus, mainly discussing about the impact of the relative polices in different countries on the on-the-job training of employees. After sorting out the theoretical documents, we have found that although more and more experts have recognised the significance of the asymmetric information on the employees, their exploitation of this field remains merely on the descriptive level and its limitation has displayed in the practice of on-the-job training. Hence, this thesis, based on the asymmetric information and the principal-agent relation between an enterprise and its employees in the course of on-the-job training, is to provide a further study for solving the problems in the course of the on-the-job training of employees. Centred on the goal, many constructive conclusions have been drawn. This thesis is composed of the following chapters. Chapter One is a brief introduction to the thesis, including the relative background information, the academic significance, the basic thought and the content of the thesis, and the comments of the relative methods of the theoretical research. Chapter Two & Chapter Three respectively devote to the analysis of the cost and the return of on-the-job training of employees under the labour market of complete or incomplete competition to display the optimal investment level of the general on-the-job training of employees under the labour market of incomplete competition. Chapter Four involves the discussion of the influence from the asymmetric information between the interior enterprise and exterior enterprise on the investment level of the general on-the-job training of employees. The research has shown that under the condition of asymmetric information an enterprise would be willing to undertake part cost of the general on-the-job training of employees, furthermore, the proportion accepted by the enterprise increases with the degree of the asymmetric information. Chapter Five analyses the effect of the skill licence on the general on-the-job training, on the condition that the return of the training is decided by both the enterprise's investment and the employees'efforts. Chapter Six deals with the possibilities of the general on-the-job training of employees to transfer the signals of good or bad enterprise, and construct a model according to the signals. Through analysing the mode, the necessary condition of separate equilibrium and in which the optimal investment level of the general on-the-job training an enterprise should choose. Chapter Seven first studies the problem of the adverse selection in the course of the general on-the-job training owing to the incomplete information; then, an information screening model has been built up to stand out the sufficient and the necessary condition of the separation for the employees with high or low qualities. Chapter Eight analyses the phenomenon of the Prisoner Dilemma in the course of specific on-the-job training of employees, and an infinite repeated game model has been given for solving the problem. Chapter Nine pays attention to the problem of the moral hazard in the course of specific on-the-job training of employees, and two fashions have been brought about as the incentive: the way of Up-or-out and the way of making the employees have the residuary asset ownership. Chapter Ten treats with the feasibilities of Ratchet Wheel Effect in the dynamic game model of the on-the-job training of employees, and gives out the solution to the problem. The innovation of this paper lies in : First, provide the new explanation that an enterprise carries on general on-the-job training to the employee --Signal transmission function of employee's on-the-job training. The reason has been analysed that general on-the-job training may be regarded as the signal of transmitting enterprise's quality, and the enterprise's general on-the-job training models basis on the signal transfer has been constructed. Through analysing the mode, the necessary condition of separate equilibrium and in which the optimal investment level of the general on-the-job training an enterprise should choose. Second, the problem of the adverse selection in the course of the generalon-the-job training owing to the incomplete information has been studied. then, an information screening model has been built up to stand out the sufficient and the necessary condition of the separation for the employees with high or low qualities. Third, the problem of the moral hazard in the course of specific on-the-job training of employees has been studied. and two fashions have been brought about as the incentive: the way of Up-or-out and the way of making the employees have the residuary asset ownership. Fourth, the On-the-job training mechanisms based on multitask principal-agent relation has been studied. At this moment, the employee will not only carry on on-the-job training , should carry on one's own work at present at the same time . If enterprise and the employee only play an single period game, the employee will not make hard in training. If enterprises can keep the cooperation for a long time with the employee , enterprise and the staff play game repeatedly, in order to seek larger future profits, the staff will make hard in training probably. Meanwhile, studying still indicates, under certain condition, employee 's diligent degree and staff's initial engineering level positive correlation in on-the-job trainin...