The Research To The Asymmetric Information Of Chinese Insurance

Chinese insurance market has been developing rapidly during the recent years. At the same time, adverse selection and moral hazard caused by asymmetric information have become big problems. Adverse selection and moral hazard reduce the insurability of risk, so the insurance mechanism lost its effect of risk control. Facing the serious asymmetric information problems between our insurer and insured, this paper studies solutions to these asymmetric information problems in our insurance market from some aspect of the game theory.First,we make some progress to improve the model by making a new mass distributing which is dominant by the price and gain a near normal distribution to approximately achieve the simulative distribution of the completely compete market .So it reflects the market modern much more factually and solutes the market equilibrium.Second,facing the question of adverse selection in the insurance market, this paper firstly describes and comments on the Rothschild-J.Stiglitz screening model with applying geometric method of the partial equilibrium. Next, the paper constructs the static insurance decision-making models in different moral hazards and a two-stage dynamic model.At last, facing the question of Moral hazard in the insurance market, firstly we employs the principal-agent theory to build the responsible insurance model, explore character of the insurance bargain optimization under two instance and in the end , have some very important conclusion. Then based on the incomplete information dynamic game theory mechanism design theory, this paper firstly takes example for forging the loss and constructs insurance fraud game model. It studies the Nash Equilibrium of the game and how buyers and sellers choose the optimal game strategy .Under the conclusion, we have the price of insurance policy that is making zero expected profit for the insurer is educed and the optimal insurance contract based on the optimal game strategy for both buyers and sellers is discussed. We can also get three solving scheme that prevent the buyers'insurance fraud.