Research On The Moral Hazard Prevention Mechanism Of Credit Villages

The village of credit mode is a new credit management mode to solve the shortage of funds in the rural financial market and to reduce the moral hazard caused by the asymmetric information in rural credit market,which has its unique operating mechanism compared with the traditional credit model.According to the practice,the moral risk behavior in rural financial market exacerbated the credit rationing phenomenon in rural areas,and the application of village credit mode has great positive role in reducing the borrower's moral hazard behavior and promoting economic development in rural areas.Therefore,it is of great significance to explore the operating mechanism of the credit village model and promote the healthy development of the credit village by studying the moral hazard behavior of the rural financial market.This paper adopts the research method of literature retrieval,research and empirical research combining theory,it is based on the existing literature,from the perspective of the village credit operation mode,contractual relationship,moral risk prevention mechanism,using the related theory of game theory and information economics,moral hazard from the borrower for the first time the use of loan funds behavior perspective on credit village mode,and through practical investigation and quantitative validation.It is the main thread of this paper to study the complex information transmission relationship and interest conflict between the three parties of the bank,the borrower and the village organization.Based on the theoretical analysis and empirical analysis,the following conclusions are drawn:(1)Under the traditional credit model,there is a serious risk behavior of the borrower.In the traditional credit model,because each villager is independent of each other,the mode of information transmission channel is single,the punishment mechanism is single and the punishment deterrence is low.These two factors make in the traditional credit model,the borrower in the bank loans for the purpose of maximizing their own income will take a greater possibility of moral hazard behavior.(2)In the credit village mode,can effectively prevent the borrower's moral hazard behavior.The mechanism and punishment is more complex and perfect information transfer in the credit village mode,other villagers will supervise the use of funds for borrowers in bank lending,and will take the results of the supervision,reporting social punishment and other measures to the bank.At the same time,theborrower in the bank's loan funds,will be more likely to use the funds for higher security low-risk use.Therefore,the credit village model makes it possible to prevent the moral hazard caused by the use of funds.(3)In the promotion of credit village mode,there are still many restricting factors.In practice,the credit village mode there are the following main problems:concentrated with phenomenon is prominent,highly concentrated risk;The credit village mode efficiency is restricted by scale;"The credit village" irrational development.The above three factors may make it harder for credit village mode to play for the stimulative function of the rural economic development and rural credit.At the same time,according to the current situation of the research conclusion and the village of credit mode in practical development,puts forward some countermeasures and suggestions to promote the rational development of the integrity of the building in rural areas,ensuring the operation efficiency,the size of the village bank credit and government jointly promote the village credit.