Study On Channel Conflict And Coordination In Distribution Channel Innovation

In accordance with the change of circumstances, the enterprises have to adjust themselves or innovate the distribution channels --for example, to flatten the channels or increase the net distribution channels –to meet the demands of competition and consumer. However, such innovation will definitely lead to the conflicts of distribution channels and such conflicts are usually violent and seriously destructive. Therefore, based on this circumstance, this dissertation tries to study how to coordinate the conflicts from the channel innovation from the following aspects: First, the dissertation discusses the motive of innovation; analyses the dynamic course of channel conflict, and the defects of Pondy's five-phase model of channel conflict. Thereupon, it proposes the dynamic model of the formation of channel conflict in the innovation. This model will utmost reflects the dynamic performance of channel conflict. In addition, according to the conflict modality and nature, it studies the optimum value and the rational conflict threshold and proposes the clue of thought and method of analysis. Second, it discusses the conflict with the Games Theory: (1) to quantify the several conflict factors among the channel members to establish the game model of the conflicts between the manufacturers and the middle-businessmen, and to discuss the decomposability attribute of the conflicts with the knowledge of the Game Theory, and then to point out that this decomposability should meet five axioms; (2) to adopt the principle of equal profit and maximum profit respectively to compare the utility of the manufacturers and the middle-businessmen in the price conflict. Through this comparison, it is found that the Nash Bargain Solution is likely to be regarded as a natural integration of the two principles; (3) to discuss in which case the two parties will choose the offensive or defensive strategy, supposing that the given manufacturers and middle-businessmen reach a valid agreement. Third, on the basis of the logic course of channel conflict coordination management, it analyses the channel conflict complexity and the influencing factors in the channel innovation, and also discusses the existent defects of Rosenbloom's conflict and channel efficiency analysis model. Thereupon, this dissertation believes that any conflict will more or less influence the channel efficiency. The influence only differs in form, manner and degree. It proceeds to discuss the principle and object of channel conflict coordination management in the innovation, the conflict prevention and forewarning methods of conflict coordination management, and coordination strategy, coordination implement procedure and the evaluation method after coordination. Fourth, it analyses the importance of relationship coordination, mainly discusses David's coordination mechanism based on the manufacturers'relationship commitment, and thinks that this mechanism model has much more defects. Thereupon, this dissertation proposes the three kinds of relationship commitments and dynamic coordination model. It differs from David's model in the following four points: first, it is proposed against the channel conflicts in the innovation; second, in this model, the manufacturers'two kinds of relationship commitments model is modified to be the distributor's three kinds of relationship commitments model; third, this model is a dynamic coordination model; fourth, the purpose of coordination is to lessen the conflict from the disconformities and promote the manufacturers'performance. Fifth, to meet the request that the ultimate results of conflict coordination need evaluation, it establishes the fuzzy evaluation model of channel members'satisfaction-degree, and discusses the criteria and contents of channel performance evaluation.