Research Of Layoff Mechanism Of Employees In Enterprise Based On Efficient Incentive

This thesis studies the efficient incentive mode and layoff mechanism of employees in enterprise, including two meanings: one is how to construct efficient incentive mechanism from the point of layoff mechanism, the other is how to design layoff mechanism in the case of the efficient incentive mode.In order to construct efficient incentive mechanism from the layoff mechanism, the thesis puts the exogenous layoff probability or endogenetic layoff probability linked with performance into the incentive model. Several principal-agent incentive models are respectively built up comprising layoff probability, aimed at the similarities and differences of employees, whether the mode of profit share is set up or not, and even symmetry or asymmetry information of the employees' abilities. In these models, both the principal (owner) are risk-neutral, and the agents (employees) are also risk-neutral or risk-averse. The research shows that asymmetry information can cause sluggish behaviour for the same type of employees, the exogenous layoff probability can restrain labour positivity and threaten the efficient labour of the employees, and reduce the agent cost. While endogenetic layoff probability cannot impact on the function of the assembled mechanisms consisting of promotion and fixed income under asymmetry information, which can avoid the moral risk of employees to achieve the same degree of their labour under symmetry information. The endogenetic layoff probability characteristic of evaluating performance enables employees with different types to work harder, increase the output and accordingly gain higher payment. The excellent employees endeavor harder than those with lower ability. The higher standard of performance and proportion of employees with higher ability can benefit to depressing the agent cost.In order to study the optimal layoff mechanism, the thesis sticks to the layoff principle of performance to display layoff probability, by means of connection of layoff probability and standard of performance. When the employees' output is observable and the employees' abilities are complete information or in asymmetry information, whether the mode of profit share is set up or not, more than two layoff models are established. In these models, both owner and employees are risk-neutral, and the owner is the principal and the employees are the agents. Based on the mode of profit share and the performance principle and the object of the enterprise, the models contain layoff probability and severance pay. Following the revelation principle, we solve the...