Study On MBO Of State-owned Enterprise In China

An MBO involves members of the incumbent management team acquiring asignificant equity stake as individuals with institutional support in order to control thecompany and to get expect prospective return, after that the corporate equity andcapital structure was changed. With the setting-up and perfection of the socialistmarket economic system in China, following the state-owned enterprise reform, thephenomenon of MBO got to enter people's vision and was put into practice.After the reform of the Stone group, a tide of MBO was raised in domesticbusiness circle from 2000. Especially, the MBO in state-owned enterprise became thesocial highlight for involving the state-run assets. Some scholars think that MBO isthe affirmation of the administrator's value, the supplement to the corporategovernance and an instructive exploration for the Chinese reform of state-ownedproperty and enterprise. While others figure out that MBO is unsuitable forstate-owned enterprise because of lacking in perfect operational policy. From thepractical angle, there are a lot of specious characteristics of MBO in China comparedwith foreign classical cases. In view of this, the MBO was studied from many aspectsin this dissertation by means of the theory of neo-institutional economics andinformation economics, hoped to provide guidance and reference for the MBO ofstate-owned enterprise.After making a brief review of the historical origin, this dissertation defines therelevant concepts and characteristics of MBO, summarizes domestic and foreigntheory survey about MBO systematically, and studies the economic meaning in MBO.In chapter 3, the dissertation reviews MBO history in several representative countriesand analyzes respective characteristic and implementing effect. Combined withChinese realistic background and concrete MBO cases, the nature difference betweenforeign and our country is given.In chapter 4, the dissertation conducts a theoretical analysis on stakeholders instate-owned enterprise's MBO. Based on that, the game behaviors among thegovernment,corporation and incumbent manager are discussed in all-run way.In chapter 5, the dissertation reviews the theory of equity and demonstrates thestructure differences between foreign countries and China. The equity nature anddistribution are studied from the viewpoint of property rights, and the rationality andinevitability in MBO are also studied in detail.In chapter 6, the dissertation concentrates on the pricing process in state-ownedenterprise's MBO. After the research on international evaluation approaches,considering the special factors with respect to state-owned enterprise, the mechanismdesign method is proposed on the equity transferring process. Additionally, accordingto credibility theory and methods, a new random fuzzy pricing model is constructed.In chapter 7, the empirical study is carried on about the effects after MBO.Quantitative methods are adopted to analyze the changes of return,risk and financialperformance. Contrast to foreign known empirical results, the dissertation draws anobjective appraisal about the MBO in China.The chapter 8 is the conclusion of this dissertation. Aiming at the legal obstacleand nonstandard phenomenon in state-owned enterprise's MBO, the relevant legalopinion and political suggestion are put forward.