Control Over The Private Interests Of Investor Protection

Recently, investor protection is becoming the focus in corporate finance, receiving great attentions from scholars both in and outside of China. Especially under the background that our stock markets have been bearish these years, it has been an important theoretical and practical subject to effectively protect the benefits of minority shareholders in order to ensure the sustainable development of the stock markets in China.This paper absorbs the previous research outcomes in corporate finance and studies the systematic mechanisms of outside investor protection from a three dimensional perspective of corporate finance, law and politics (government) aiming to find a solution to the self-realization of investor protection under the current financial ecological environment in China.This paper consists of four chapters. The first one is the summary of the literature of private benefits of control. It summarizes the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of private benefits of control and presents the existing research outcomes, which lays a foundation for the following chapters. The second one discusses the corporate ownership right, control right and investor protection. Ownership structure is of great significance to the self-realization mechanism of restricting the expropriation behavior. Beginning with the evolution of the research on corporate ownership structure in by scholars, we build a theoretical model to analyze the expropriation behavior by control owner under the pyramid control structure based on the study of control realization characteristics in the control owner mode and the empirical study of the pyramid control structure in China. Law construction, enforcement efficiency and investor protection fall into the third chapter. It studies the legal mechanism of investor protection from the perspective of law and finance and discusses the relationship among ownership structure, enforcement strength and investor protection through theoretical model and empirical analysis. The fourth one examines the relationship between government behavior and investor protection. As the law maker and executor, the government may expropriate outside investor's benefits by intervening in firms with its power. While the ownership structure may influence the cost of government intervening. This chapter discusses the relationship among political behavior, law and corporate...