An Empirical Study On The Relationship Between Ownership Structuer Of Chinese's Listed Companies And Private Benefits Of Control

As the research in the field of Corporate Governance deepens, the role of contorlling shareholder has attracted more attention, the core issue in corporate governance theory and practice has been shitfed from the focus of attention placed on the traditional the principal-agent relationship between the owners and operators to the question that how to deal with the agent problem between the controlling shareholders and randnon-controlling shareholders. Therefore, in most countries, how to regulate such abuses of corporate governance has become a challenge, the most cutting-edge research topics of private benefits of control issue results in today's corporate governance.Ownership structure is the basic of corporation governance structure, and the basic of the controling shareholders gaining the private benefits of control. There are consanguineous relations between ownership structure, private benefits of control and corporation governance. Most Chinese's listed firms are coming into being in the process of the reform of enterprises. Due to the characteristic of historical background of planned economy and imperfection of market environment in shunt economy period, the ownership structure and the approach or impact of its act on private benefits of control mechanism in Chinese's listed firms is distinctly dissimilar with other nations. In the light of the actual conditions, the paper validates the relativity between ownership structure and private benefits of control through the analysis of theory and demonstration on the relation of them.The thesis is based on the reviews on the research of the relation between ownership structure and private benefits of control in domestic and oversea. Then, it analyzes that the relation through the analysis of a series market entire data based on 192 samples of control transactions of non-tradable shares between the year of 2005 and 2007 in A-share market in China, treats the actuality of ownership structure in Chinese's listed firms, and analyzes the infection of ownership composition and focus degree to private benefits of control. It put forwards the research hypothesis, which emphasizes the relation between ownership composition, including the relationship between the proportion of state-owned shares, legal person shares and the private benefits of control, and also which emphasizes the relation between focus degree, including the relationship between the proportion of the largest shareholder equity ratio, the second to the tenth largest shareholder equity ratio, degree of checks and balances as well as ownership dispersion and the private benefits of control. In order to avoid multi-collinearity problems, the thesis sets up the corresponding regression analysis model, and investigates the regression coefficient and connection, and analyzes the testing result, at last summarizes the conclusion of demonstration.The results show that:(1) Private benefits of control is widespread in Chinese's listed companies, and the level is of differences; (2) State-ownedshares has significant positive correlation with the private beneifts of control, but juristic person stork has significant negative correlation with the private beneifts of control in ownership composition; (3) Degree of checks and balances is not the main variables of affecting the private benefits of control, the largest shareholder equity ratio has significant positive correlation with the private beneifts of control, degree of checks and balances as well as ownership dispersion and the private benefits of control. Thus, the conclusions show:on the one hand, we should raise the proportion of juristic person stork oppropriatly, on the other hand, establishing a sound and reasonable equity structure in listed companies, formating of a truly effective check and balance, thereby reducing the private benefits of control in listed companies, and improving corporate governance efficiency.