Study On Ownership Concentration, Investor Protection And Corporate Performance

30years recently, at home and abroad studies on the relevance between corporate governance and firm performance have sprung up, yielded fruitful results. With the deepening of the theoretical research, the purpose of the study of corporate governance is no longer confined to the establishment of reasonable ownership structure, but increasingly focus on the deeper meaning that is protecting the interests of medium and small investors. Most of the listed companies in China share ownership concentration, especially in the Small and Medium Enterprise Board, this has induced that our company’s main agency problem mainly exists between insiders and outside shareholders. With the development of China’s securities market, numerous examples showed the interests of small shareholders have been infringed.The uncoordination between small and medium investors protection level and market development has evolved into a hindrance standing in the way to a stable and sustainable securities market.So this passage put ownership concentration, investor protection and corporate performance into a unified framework to study.This paper first reviews the relevant theories, combing and analyzing theories of corporate governance based on a conflict of interests, have the three elements concepts defined, and then elaborates on the interactive relevance between ownership concentration and firm performance, investor protection and firm performance, ownership concentration and investor protection, in the end sets Small and Medium Enterprise Board listed companies’data as an example to empirically support the above theory.According to the empirical results, the paper argues that with a low level legal protection of the environment, a high concentration in the SME listed companies is an alternative protection mechanism to medium and small investors, has a positive effect on enhancing the company’s performance. But "the dominance in one stockholder" and low degree of checks and balances stake of the largest shareholder, is not conducive to the elevation. Face up to the status quo of ownership concentration of SME listed companies in China, strengthening balance and oversight of major shareholders, is an important way to optimize internal governance and improve medium and small investor protection.