The Theoretical And Empirical Research On M&A Of China's Enterprises

The successful merge and acquisition (M&A) plays a significant role in the development of the enterprise, so M&A is always being an eternal hot issue in the capital market all over the world. However, there are some prominent problems such as the small scale, the simple structure, and the weak operational mechanism China's enterprises have to encounter in the increasing fierce competition environment. How to catch the opportunity to run the big-scale enterprise with the core competitiveness in the tidal of M&A becomes one of the important issues about the development of China's enterprises. Telling from the cases of M&A, we can find many unsuccessful cases. Concerning about the supervision of the M&A, the M&A process of some big-scale enterprises, especially the enterprises related to the transition of state-owned assets, is not smooth or even in the dead-end because of the problems of examination and approval. Therefore, how to use M&A to accelerate the growth and development of the enterprises and how governments instruct and supervise the enterprises to do M&A, are the realistic questions we should answer.This paper, through the study on enterprises M&A, aims at providing some suggestions for the concerned governmental departments when they are making the reasonable supervision policies so as to help enterprises to develop by M&A, to improve the efficiency of enterprises M&A. And, this paper tries to focus on and find the consistence and connection between the cause and performance of enterprises M&A.The theories of China's enterprises M&A is lagging behind the practice. The current research on enterprises M&A emphasizes partly on the strategy of enterprises M&A, the procedure of enterprises M&A and case study of enterprises M&A. there is less profound research on the governmental supervision to enterprises M&A by cause analysis, performance analysis and affecting factor analysis. Hence, this paper, from New Institutional Economics perspective, do the theoretical analysis on the cause and performance of enterprises M&A with the empirical test in order to provide the suggestions for the concerned departments to make supervision policies about enterprises M&A and in order for the development of enterprises through the enterprises M&A.There are six chapters in this paper.It is the theoretical reviews about the enterprises M&A in chapter one. This chapter makes the comprehensive review and conclusion about the basic concept, the theory of enterprises M&A from the cause of M&A and the performance of M&A.It is the demonstration of the economic theory related to the enterprises M&A, in which we seek for the theoretical support from Marxism Economics and New Institutional Economics. Importantly, the theories of the institutional economists like Coase, Williamson, Alchian and Demsetz supply the Institutional Economics foundations for the research about enterprises M&A, which also give a unique perspective for the theoretical analysis.Chapter three introduces the development history and current situation of enterprises M&A home and abroad, only including chapter two. In this section, we make a simple look-back and comparison of the enterprises M&A at home and broad so as to seize the historical clue and intuitionally grasp the main features of the enterprises M&A, which helps the paper to find out the realistic support for the theory of the enterprises M&A. owing to the origination of the enterprises M&A from western developed market-economy countries where the theories of the enterprises M&A comes into being, the differences between the development history of China and the situation of the western developed market-economy countries require to compare them with the intention of providing the valuable reference and instruction for the empirical research and practice of China's the enterprises M&A. what's more, we analyze the new tendency of the enterprises M&A after the reform of China's share-right distribution.In chapter four, the paper analyze the cause and performance of the enterprises M&A from Institutional Economics perspective. As a result, we find the connection among enterprise institution, the cause of M&A, institutional environment, and the performance of M&A, and also, comprehensively analyze and conclude the affecting factors to the performance of the enterprises M&A. M&A is the process of the institutional change of the mergee's property rights which surely influences the behavior of the players. The property rights will bring out the predictable influence to resource allocation, output and revenue by influencing the behavior of the players. Therefore, not considering the decision error of players, the performance of the enterprises M&A is predicable. Nevertheless, thanks to the existence of high information cost during the operation of the realistic economy, the player are not possible to be the economic man while irrationality and opportunism will influence the results of the enterprises M&A. consequently, the performance is not the simple cause prediction of the enterprises M&A any more, but the comprehensive result influenced by the cause, transaction cost of the enterprises M&A.Chapter five empirically test the theories concluded in chapter four with China's listed company as samples. On one side, we evaluate the total trend of the enterprises M&A, on the other side, we test all the factors to the performance of the enterprises M&A so that we can have the theoretical support for the solution and measurement improving the performance of the enterprises M&A.Chapter five makes the suggestions how to improve the performance of China's enterprises M&A. Based on the results of theoretical and empirical research, we put forward the policy suggestions of improve the performance of M&A of China's listed company in enterprise institution and market environment which are the major factors of influencing the performance of the enterprises M&A in the meantime, owing to the huge influence of the restructure after M&A to the performance of the enterprises M&A, we emphasize on discussing the restructure of the enterprises M&A. the enterprises M&A probably leads to the monopoly and restricted competition that may block the further development of the entire economy, thereby, we analyze the reasonable control of the behavior of the enterprises M&A from China's reality in the end of this section.There are several possible conclusions the paper draws as follows:I .Theoretically analyzing the cause and performance of the enterprises M&A from the brand-new perspective of Institutional Economics, The paper discovers the internal relationships among the enterprise institution, the cause of M&A, the institutional environment and the performance of M&A and comprehensively analyzes and concludes every factor that may influence the performance of the enterprises M&A.II . In the process of the empirical analysis, through the general inspection of the sample companies selected, we find out that some sample companies possibly had the many affairs of M&A, separation and the transition of control rights in the sample year, so we pick out those factors that may affect the performance of sample companies in the empirical analysis. Therefore, the research result can be more objective and accurate.Different from the samples selected by previous empirical research on M&A, the samples the paper selects are the ones of 2003 or 2004, when a series of the rules and laws that still work until now have been stipulated, such as the Acquisition Management of the Listed Company, the Information Disclosure Management of the Change of the Shareholders of the Listed Company ( with five supplemental rules), the Notice of the Fateful Purchase, Vend and permutation of the Assets of the Listed Company, the Notice of the Criterion of the Transition of the Actual Control Right of the Listed Company. Therefore, the empirical results of the paper are more meaningful and practicable to the current M&A.The paper empirically tests the influential degree of the factors such as the ownership structure, assets specialization, and the payment to the performance of the enterprises M&A.