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Study On Government Behaviors In The Process Of Land Non-agricultural Conversion

Posted on:2007-03-12Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:F ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360215462837Subject:Land Resource Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Land non-agricultural conversion is an inevitable trend during the economic growthprocess. However, as indispensable natural resource, farmland has such societal value asfood and ecological security, besides economic value. Enough farmland is the guarantee acountry achieves sustainable development. As a result, many countries intervene in thecourse of land non-agricultural conversion. Our government has also been concerning itand constituted the strictest system of cultivated land protection and land management tocontrol it. Different from general market economy country, our country directly intervenesinto the course of land non-agricultural conversion and makes it behavior of government.So in our country, the behavior of government directly influences the land non-agriculturalconversion, it may be the key or foundation of the land well-regulated conversion.However in the real life, the behavior of government, especially local governmentssometimes becomes the significant reason of the land out-of-order conversion. Thereforegovernment should be an important object in the study on the land conversion in ourcountry. And it is necessary to know the behavior characteristic of the government and itssystem causation. From the view of game between the central and local governments, thisthesis analyses these problems in order to offer references for perfecting the governmentbehavior and accelerating the land well-regulated conversion.Firstly, the thesis expatiates on the background, content, basic concept, train ofthoughts, method and data source of the study. It reviews and appraises the existingcorrelative study.The main part is concerning land non-agricultural conversion and the government goal.This part is to explain the orientation of the central and local governments. The resultsshow that land non-agricultural conversion is not only the process of land resourceallocation, but also the process of affecting the government behavior objective. Its scale,speed, procedures, distribution of land income and the land prices are all related to the central and local governments objectives. According to the relationship between the landnon-agricultural conversion and the government objectives, the author thinks that, beforereform and opening-up the orientation of central government is to reduce the cost of theland non-agricultural conversion and since that it turns into restraining its scale, reducingits cost, promoting land market reform and protecting the behalf of farmer without land.Accordingly, before it the orientation of local governments is to implement the centralgovernment's policy. Since reform and opening-up, it becomes multiplex includingimplementing the central government's policy, seeking to maximize the scale of landnon-agricultural conversion and self-contradictory orientation in land market reform. In aword, the local governments hope to gain more land and capital for non-agriculturalconstruction, in order to obtain greater economic and political interests. Apparently, there isdisaccord between the behavior orientations of central and local governments since reformand opening-up, which means there may be game between them during the process of landnon-agricultural conversion.After that the analysis of the orientations of the central and local governments in theprocess of land conversion, the article analyzes their modes. The study shows that thecentral government achieves its goals mainly through the formulation and revision of thepolicy of land conversion, monitor the local governments' behavior. Before reform andopening-up, the central government achieves its goal by the way of canceling land marketand making land confiscation the main approach of land non-agricultural conversion.However this system arrangement also enables the local governments game with the centralgovernment. Since reform and opening-up, the central government maintains thecompelling land confiscation, the strictest farmland protection system and so on, toachieves its goals. As for the local governments, they achieve their goals throughimplementing the central government's policy before it and out-of-line or innovative waysafter it. The choice of concrete behavior mode lies on the game status between them.A theoretical game model is constructed in order to explain local governments'behaviors as well as the monitor and innovation of the central government during theprogress of the land non-agricultural conversion. The results show that the centralgovernment punishment is related to the national economic situation. When in a balancedor constrictive situation, the central government may relax; when in a overheated situation,the central government will intensify the punishment. The cause is the conventionalconcept of development and limitations of the existing system. As for local governments, "illegal" is commonly the best choice. Under the existing system, the central government has the motive to change the system because it has not made the avail maximum. In fact, the central government has carded out transformation several times since reform and opening-up, but invalid. From now on, the cost of local governments for "illegal" should be increased and the benefits of local government from the land non-agricultural conversion should be reduced.After the theoretical analysis, the thesis investigates the"××Event" in order to verify it.Based on the aforementioned study, the thesis finally advances suggestions to perfect the government behaviors, such as strengthening education to make officer building up correct views of development and achievement, making the punishment of central government believable threaten, transiting the governments' function during the course of the land non-agricultural conversion.
Keywords/Search Tags:land non-agricultural conversion, central government, local governments, game theory
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