Research On The Game Between Central And Local Governments In Real Estate Regulation In The Last Ten Years

Since 1998,the housing system reform in our country has experienced explosive growth.In order to curb the blind investment,disorderly expansion and rapid rise in housing prices,protect the healthy and orderly development of the real estate market,the central government has repeatedly adjusted.However,it is not difficult to find out the history of regulation over the past ten years,a considerable part of the policy has not really achieved the purpose.Although the real estate regulation effect is not good for many reasons,but the core reason lies in is that policy executor of the local government is not only the object of regulation,but also stakeholders.In the real estate regulation,local governments continue to play a game with the central government,resulting in policy distortion,deviation and obstruction.The research is based on the ten years of China's real estate regulation by using the method of game theory.Firstly,from the theoretical analysis on China's current political system,in the real estate regulation pattern of the game between central government and local governments and their respective interests,to explore their available means of payment and game the strategy,and the potential impact of the overall construction of the study framework.Secondly,this paper reviews the ten years of China's real estate regulation policy change,real estate of our country from the macro level of ups and downs,analysis of various problems to deal with the real estate market,the evolution of the central regulation of real estate policies,changes and perspective of central policy objectives and means of regulation.At the same time,study the behavior of local government in the implementation of real estate regulation policy.On this basis,to study the interaction analysis of the central and local implementation of the regulation of real estate policies,the degree of realization and the overall analysis of the central regulation of real estate policy objectives,as well as the development of China's real estate marketcaused by various effects.Thirdly,based on the overall analysis of China's real estate regulatory policy and regulatory effect in ten years,from the point of view,analyze in different periods and different policy implementation of specific objectives,strategy and effect of central and local governments,and then analyzes the causes in the effect of different regulation in different period,reason and on the part of policy failure or failure.Finally,from the perspective of more scientific and more effective regulation of real estate to scientifically construct the game pattern of the central and local governments in China real estate regulation,including interest distribution,power sharing pattern and responsibility sharing pattern etc… This paper tries to put forward some feasible policy recommendations about how to introduce more to achieve the balance of interests of central and local governments,and a policy system can be more precise control,and how to more effectively regulate local government,ensure that the central control policies can't choose not to buckle the implementation path,tries to put forward some feasible policy recommendations.