On The Fiscal Subsidy System During Ecological Rehabilitation

The research theme of this paper is construction and adjusting of fiscal subsidy system during ecological rehabilitation. Based on the new research platform founded by ecological ecologists, this paper, with institutional logics, explains the character of fiscal subsidy system as ecological notion enters into public economics. This paper sees the course of ecological rehabilitations and destroys as an interaction course among the central government, the local governments and the peoples. On condition that the utility of ecology enters into the utility functions, games on ecological rehabilitation among the central government, the local governments and the peoples, become the prime clue of ecological-based fiscal subsidy system. Through course analysis of ecological economy, this paper, at certain extent, suggests the anti-ecology character of fiscal subsidy system, and offers the subsidy system design coordinate with ecological-economics laws. Content of each chapter and possible innovation point see as below.Chapter 1: introduction. Based on ecological rehibilatation practice, this chapter offers the research theme. The clue of research thought, research content and research methods are determined after review of literatures home and abroad.Chapter 2: fundmental of EBPF subsidy theory. Under the condition of environmental destruction and ecological deterioration, public economics confronts paragon's crisis with the development of sustainable development theory. Based on public economics and ecological economics, ecological economics of public sector or ecology-based public finance (EBPF) is necessary when studying public action in eco-economic system. The idea of EBPF can review thinking of public finance in current research, give suggestions on research of subsidy actions under sustainable development.Chapter 3: transcending of ecological goal between governments and losses of subsidy efficiency. Within the framework of dual-task principle-agent model, this chapter proposes that the lower quality of man-made forestry mainly due to incentive-incompatibility that may exist in the enforcement of the cropland conversion program. This chapter describes the cropland conversion program as goal-sending sequence from central government to local government through wage contract. As recent literatures don't pay more attention to action mechanism of local government in the decision of forestry quality, this chapter analyses the endowments value and market prices fluctuation of local government confronted. This chapter improves that 3 factors, such as market value fluctuation of forestry products, uncertainty of sci-technology income, and inaccuracy of quality standard, can made wage contract incentive-incompatibility, which waken the quality action mood of local government. According to research reports of cropland conversion, this chapter proves that incentive deficits of conversion quality to local government are decisive factor to lower forestry quality.Chapter 4: evolution of character, distribution of efforts and selection of fiscal subsidy way. This chapter proposes principal-agent models of profit distributions in the whole progress of the ecological recovery program, and deduces the best subsidy way during implantation of the ecological program. As subsidy system during ecological recovery program is not deeply dynamic analyzed, this chapter treats ecological recovery program as a three-period, cooperative production progress participated by central government, local government and farmer. After evolution of the character and transfer of leading organization are analyzed, this chapter proves by periods that different period has different preference to the subsidy way, and gets the influence factors of the best effort distribution. This chapter suggests the best subsidy way during the ecological program, and condition of the best subsidy contracts.Chapter 5: public failure during ecological supervision. This chapter sets three gaming models to explain the government failure in ecological supervision. This chapter constitutes a static game model of incomplete information in environment supervision, and identifies that coalition should be the first-best selection when institutional environment was suitable. This chapter offers a dual-task principal-agent model, and identifies that intervene from local government based on fiscal mode, should be the institutional reason for over-the-quota harvesting by state-owned forest farms. Based on the performance difference of different right move way, this chapter gives a theoretical explain the performance of supervision in the cropland conversion program.Chapter 6: ecological subsidy of government under evolution games.Based on evolutionary game model, this chapter offers an explanation of move mechanism and equilibrium outcomes to ecological rehabilitation and destroys after China's foundation. Recent literatures all analysis the cropland conversion policy based on presumption of wholly rationality, this chapter sees the course as a learning-by-doing course, which means all subject's strategies and equilibriums are the outcomes of learning-by-doing. This chapter deduces that subsidy, supervision, and obsession from the central government, internality preference of the local government, are the necessary conditions for the effective motion for the cropland conversion.Chapter 7: innovation of ecological subsidy sestem and necessary conditions. This chapter, based on analysis above, also offers feasible innovations of fiscal subsidy sestem during ecological rehibilation. The social environment and the necessary conditions for ecology-based public finance are also suggested.