The Research Of Government Project Build Operate Institutions Based On The Payment Structure Of Decision Makers

In the field of the transformation in government investment system, the processes of reform practice that China and western market economy countries experienced are similar, while have many great differences. There are so many theoretical and practical problems which need to be solved during these processes. These questions can be induced as follows, first, many running styles can not be used in China, while these institution can be operated very well in western countries, i.e. the phenomena so called "better known, but less used". The second is, if we can give a uniform framework and from angle of view to interpret the running styles of government projects commonly in all over the countries in the world, these styles have been widely existed over times.Aiming at those two questions, we set up a simple analyzing framework in the running styles of government projects (The Build Operate Institution), using the theory of transition economics, institutional economics and game theory. This model with sequel function and payment structures is based on the equilibrium of micro-agents' decisions and games, uses the methods of contract theory. By finding out the foundations of the differences in the Build Operate Institution, we hope to solve the two questions above. Our analysis is organized by the following framework: Firstly, we set up a framework which bases on the games between the public, the government agency and the public investment sector. Those three players make up their decisions on the payment structure. We decompose the three-player games in details by the next, that is, we analyze the game between the public and the government agency, and the game between the government agency and the public investment sector. Also we analyze the inflections of the payment structure to the equilibriums of those games.Here we demonstrate the conclusions as follows:(1) Base on the payment structure of the public and the government agency, the choice of the Build Operate Institution in the government project correspond to the equilibriums in the games between the two, and the distribute in the interests. The multiple equilibriums of the games correspond to the various patterns of running style of the government projects.(2) During the rent seeking by administration agent, the proportion of offering bribes to the government agent by market player has nothing to do with the size of the rent seeking set decided by the agent. It is depend on the penalty factor confirmed by public, furthermore, on the probability of being detected. The rise of both the penalty factor and the probability of being detected will exert an influence on the player's motivation, reducing the proportion of offering bribes. However, the set of rent seeking closely related to the level of agent's sallary, the probability of being detected and penalty factor.(3) When administration agents check the price of public goods, the optimal equilibrium is the point where the marginal rate of utility transformation equals to the absolute value of ratio of marginal rate of financial subsidy to marginal dissatisfaction. Through changing the rate of financial subsidy and the marginal space of public dissatisfaction, the decision of price checking by the agents can be influenced. The modifying can be obtained by changing the agents' payoff structure.(4) On the process of administration agents' attempt to introduce social investors to government projects, the incompleteness of contract will put barriers on it. The possible ex post renegotiation may cause the deficiency of ex ante investment incentives. For the reason of specific asset, the investment in government projects will produce appropriable rents, which may induce governments' opportunism to encroach social investors' benefits. On back on the incompleteness of contract, the expectation of ex post renegotiation by contractors will affect their ex ante investment incentives.(5) The actual organization styles of running government project are closely related with the risk of the project, the level of administration agent and the reserve income of social investors. The more the risk is, the more uncertainty will be, and a lower possibility of innovation of new institutions of running government projects; the higher level of administration agent is, the more possibility comes; the higher the reserve income of social investors is,the lower possibility of innovation of new institutions of running government projects will be.As the equilibrium choice, whether social investors participate in government project depends on the factors endogenously: the construction goal driven and the extent of financing restriction of administration agents, market players' reserved benefits, and the capability of control the risk of fulfilling the contract and if the common knowledge can be recognized by the opponent.At last, as an empirical examination, we make econometrical analysis of the sample data from electric power industry in government investment system, and case analysis on Cross River Tunnel Project at the upstream of Yangtse River in Nanjing, to test the theoretical model.