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Common Pool Resource Governance's Course Research Based On Heterogeneity

Posted on:2008-02-18Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y L LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:1119360215498571Subject:Management Science and Engineering
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Common Property Resource is universal in human society. The benefits fromCommon Property Resource' s self-governance become common profit for everyonein the community. It needs community cooperation to acquire. But because thebenefit is non-exclusive, so free-ride is the main obstacle to governance theCPR. Ther are many cases of success collective action, but we have not aeffective theory to explain.The tradional collective action theory is too abstract. Individual isabsolute selfish, ignoring that the individual decision and action based ontemporal environment. It is too difficult to explain the actual case. Thereal-life analyasis is to analyaze heterogeneity individual who pursueinterest maximum though game can achieve Collective action' s organision.The start port of this article is individual make a decision based on realisticscene, the analysis fasten on course of game. Different from the tradionalcollective action theory, this article looks the collective action as a courseof two phases. Though our research,we found the conclusion.(1) Individual heterogeneity and the role in collective action. At thephase of initiate, this article introduces indiyidual heterogeneity and usea model to analyze individual strategy and equilibrium. We think differentactor become different role in course of collective action. Someone act asleaders, or followers or free-riders.(2) Rule and norm for implemention of collective action. At the phase ofthe implemention, the collective action can come true base on informal andformal institution to governance the share of cost and profit in CommonProperty Resource' s self-governance and encourage cooperation action andpunish non-cooperation action.(3) The co-possessed property and common environment as all owner'scommon resource. So the homeowners Self-governance is a institution to carryout common resource' s governance. Every owner-occupier want to participatein the self-governance, but they also want become a free-rider.(4) There are keyman of organiger in owner-occupier Self-governance and ordinary participator. Based on heterogeneity of income,size of housing andso on, some owner-occupier act as organiger and the others act as ordinaryparticipator. This articleuse the theory of community norm to analyze uptown's Common Property Resource self-governance and think that the formalistitution of rule and the informal institution of norm is important forimplement of collective action.At last, Though the survey date from nanjing uptown to test the elementfor community cooperation, we prove that the keyman of organiger,the formalistitution of rule,the informale institution of norm are key element forthe success of collective action.
Keywords/Search Tags:collective action, common pool resource, heterogeneity, game
PDF Full Text Request
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