Study Of Incentive And Restraint Mechanism For Occupational Pension Management

The question of aging has been recognized a worldwide baffling problem. What we have been pursuing for a long time is that there is no need to worry about the life when we are aged. The embezzlement case of Shanghai social protecting capital and Guangzhou annuity has sounded the tocsin to us, which is caused by the weakness of the restriction and supervision system. At present, the occupational pension as the second mainstay of the aged social security has drawn wide attention and discussion. Therefore, such issues as completion of our aged social security system, protection of the legal rights and interests of Occupational Pension Fund(OPF) beneficiary, realization of the increment of OPF, regulation of OPF, exercise a great influence.OPF is different from the bond investment fund in that due to the intrust form, the trustee of OPF plays a dual role in the trade process, while the investment manger who to a large extent decides the increase of OPF in value is the core of the operation of OPF. In order to protect the legal rights of beneficiary effectively, the incentive and restraint system is so important that it is the core of keeping away the moral venture of the trustee and the investment manger. However, little study on the incentive and restraint system of OPF has been done so far. Nowadays, due to the incompletion of our capital market, the author claims that the construction and completion of the effective incentive and restraint system is of significance to the development of OPF.The trustee as the core of the OPF operation and the centre of the information transmission, is the link of the client and parties concerned. The thesis analyses the relationship among the parties of OPF, and how to prevent such the trend of opportunism that the deputy can do some damage to the client under the condition of the asymmetric information; deals with the seeking rent deeds of the main body of OPF operation according to the static-state game theory of the incomplete information. The study claims that the trustee should not only strengthen the supervision but also the punishment on the deputy. The operation management of OPF is a complicated process. According to the analysis of the organization form of OPF, the best choice for us is trust form.It is the effective way to get the trustee involved for ensuring the safety of OPF in form of substance and law. However there also exsits a systematic limitation for the trustee who has no necessary relation to the beneficiary who can only claim their rights through the third party. In order to overcome this limitation, in the thesis, it is designed an operation mode of OPF in which the trustee plays a dual role of the trustee and client, so as to strengthen functional supervision and self-discipline, and ensure the most benefit of the beneficiary.The incentive mechanism is designed for the investment manager with the principal-agent theory used to make a comparative study between the trustee and the investment manager, in the condition of moral venture and no moral venture. In order to protect the benefit of the beneficiary from the investment manager's moral venture deeds, it should increase the coefficient of incent and the investment manager's share proportion toward the overplus request right of the fund. The thesis discusses the incentive optimal issue on investment manager, from the aspects of the distribution of time and energy about the increment of OPF.The reputation incentive is a process of long-term accumulation, a good reputation can make up for a defect that the investment manager is not given enough incentive by the overt promption. The thesis analyses the opportunism deeds of investment manager with the reputation mechanism, which is undoubtedly good for the investment manager's self incent and restriction.The thesis presents a review study about the investment manager's deeds of OPF within the second comparative performance index of DEA theory; puts the venture budget theory into the OPF management; designs the management expense with the game theory. It restricts the investment manager's moral venture deeds; realizes the best allocation of OPF which is good for the formation of the investment manager's invest style, all of which results in the increase of OPF.A systematic analysis about such issues as the supervision restriction choice toward the OPF investment manager, information exposure and relevant deal is given. Using the experiences of the developed countries and Latin America for reference, the thesis puts forward the improvement measures of OPF.