Analysisi On The Principal-Agent Risk In The Chinese Corporation Pension Fund Motion

The paper researches on the principal-agent relations of Chinese corporation pension funds' motion, discusses the new thinking and direction to keep look out of and control the risks of Chinese principal-agent with the background of Chinese corporation pension funds' entering market,. It can be referred to by Chinese government to make policies for protecting the security, stability and rent ability of corporation pension funds.The paper is divided into four parts. Part one mainly explains the theory characteristic and sketches the chart of financial flow of the corporation pension funds. It also discerns risks which the corporation pension funds are facing during its motion. Part two analyses the causes for principal- agent risks during the corporation pension funds' investment. Part three pays attentions to analyses the characteristics of principal-agent risks during the investment of Chinese corporation pension funds. The last part is a focal point, it proposes the suggestion that how to take precautions against and control the risks of principal-agent in China.In the paper, it's helpful for the corporation pension funds to preserve value and appreciate that Chinese corporation pension funds adopt the trust management modes, establishes the multi-level principal-agent relationships after it entering market. But the existence of principal-agent' risks also changes the security and stability of the corporation pension funds. In theories, the forms of principal-agent's expression are adverse selection and moral hazard, but Chinese corporation pension funds have its own characteristics. So the precaution and controlling of principal-agent risks must refer to Chinese characteristics on one hand, on the other hand, it also should set about designing the contracts, incentive mechanism and supervision policies.The innovation of the paper lies in discerning the risks of corporation pension funds' risks after depicting the chart of finical flow. And it solves the principal-agent risks of Chinese corporation pension funds during its motion combining principal-agent theories and the Chinese specific conditions together from the design of contracts, incentive mechanism, markets of pension managers and supervision policies.