The Study Of The Benefits Of Corporate Control

The paper mainly explains why benefits of corporate control are produced, supplys the model of benefits structure of manager control and the one of stockholder control, analyzes the conflicts between corporate insider and corporate outsider in choosing a capital structure, and in choosing a payment policy, offers some differences between them under above three conditions, studys the game process under the condition that they commonly carrys the corporate control。The paper gives a research about high benefits of control in the listed corporates of making industry from shanghai stock exchange, analyzes the shortages about the arrangement of the system of corporate control, and according to those supplys some advice in future。The paper applys some methods such as marginal theory, game theory, pwnership theory, system theory, empirical method, normative method and law theory。The paper lastly concludes following ideas:The first is the idea that under the same other condition, there is a positive relation between flaw control and benefits of control, and a positive relation between uncomplete contract and benefits of control, and a positive relation between unsymmetrical information and benefits of control, and a positive relation between common revenue from the supervision and benefits of control。 The seconed is the idea that benefits of manager control is made up of the fixed incoming, bonus, enteraining expenditure, and reputation revenue。There are many factors which affect benefits of manager control such as corporate assets, former benefits of manager control, assect liability ration, the capacity of corporate growth, affiliated trade, and law protection。The manager prefers the low debt compared with oursiders, who also has the preference of enlarging corporate scale, and enforcing the diversification and choosing the low payment policy, if extra benefits of control is more, it will produce much negative effect on corporate performance, or else it only does small and even good to the performance。The third is the idea that benefits of stockholder control are from the using resource from its controlling corporate, the free warranty from its controlling corporate, and the associated dealing with its controlling corporate。It is affected by some factors such as corporate assect, assect structure, capital structure, law protection, the capacity of corporate growth, the number of independent director, whether controlling or not, whether government-controlling or not, whether existing a outside stockholder who carrys a share of over 5% or not。The fourth is the idea that though corporate insiders prefer increasing project scale, choosing low debt capital and low payment policy, there are even some differences between managers and big stockholder。The Manager will consider unadvantaged effects toward his control and impacts towards his reputation revenue when they do those。On the contrary those impacts are so small for big stockholder in short term, and they can dare to acquire much benefits ofcontrol。The benefits of manager control can only produce small impacts toward corporate performance, and the benefits of stockholder control does much bad to corporate performance。The fifth is the idea that under the condtion that before their decisions they have no chance to communicate, the big stockholder has no motivation to acquire benefits of control, and the manager only acquire the normal revenue(or active revenue), and it is in the best equilibrium, and beneficial to realize the most society welfare。But in reality, they often acquire high benefits of control commonly since chances of communication with each other are many more。Under the condition of mixed game theory, they will choose the correspondent strategy。The sixth is the idea that in Chinese listed corporate beyond benefits of manager control is not serious。There is a positive relation between benefits of manager control and corporate inertia, and it reflects that if corporate assets are many ore, and former administration cost is just so, benefits of manager control will also be much more。There is a negative relation between benefits of manager control and cash flow, and it reflects that if the capacity of corporate growth is larger and it will lead to reduction of exceeding cash, the benefits of manager control will become smaller。There is a positive relation between benefits of manager control and affiliated trade, and it reflects that managers will commonly try to reasize most benefits of control with the big stockholder。There is a positive relation between of manager control and insider supervision toward managers, and it reflects that insider supervision is not workingo Weak positive relation between benefits of manager control and corporate performance reflects that in Chinese listed corporates there is not much beyond benefits of manager control。The seventh is the idea that benefits of stockholder control lies in Chinese listed corporates。Under the same other conditions, there is much more benefits of stockholder control in controlling corporates than in uncontrolling corporates, and much more in state-controlling corporates than in unstate-controlling corporate, and much more in corporates in which there is a stockholder who owns a share of over 5% than in corporates in which there is not, and much more in corporates in which the big stockholder has undertaken top controller than in corporates in which the big stockholder has not。The relation between benefits of big stockholder control and corporate scale is positive, and the relation between benefits of stockholder control and assets liability ration is negative, and the relation between benefits of stockholder control and the capacity of corporate growth is negative, there is a obvious negative relation between benefits of stockholder control and corporate performance。The eighth is the idea that there are some shortages about the arrangement of the system of corporate control which lead to higher benefits of controlo One of shortages is that the arrangement of control right is unbalance, and it produces the state of super control toward corporate o One of them is that information published is serous unbalance between insiders and outsiders, and there are some defect in the content of information published, in the time of information published and in the penalty toward deviating the law of information published。One of them is that supervision toward corporate insiders is weak, and it leads to the low venture cost to acquire high benefits of control because the chance of discovering insiders acquiring high benefits of control is small, and according to those actions the penalty from government is also lowo One of them is that the cost of block trade is high because stocks being in circulation are small, and the progress of block trade is too complex, and the period of block trade is also too long。One of them is that the market of manager is not developed, and it leads to the high cost of changing each other, and the supervisory association between managers and big stockholder cannot be produced。One of them is that the outside finance market is complete open toward those corporates in which there is a serious problem about the benefits of corporate control。The ninth is the idea that there are some solutions which can be used to reduce benefits of control in Chinese listed corporates such as establishing the system of impairing super control right of big stockholders, and the system of strengthing the control right of outside investors, and the system of working undependent director, and the system of effective supervision, and the system of perfect information published, and the system of reducing the cost of block trade, and the system of developed manager market, and the system of new finance。...