Institutional Evolution: The Strong Reciprocity Model Of Government

The institutional evolution is an important field in evolutionary economics research. In research of the traditional Neo-Classical Economics, institution is treated as a fixed quantity. However, it is introduced into the analytical paradigm of economics as an important economical variable by institutional economics. And its dynamical course is described by evolutionary means in the institutional evolution theory. The current researches in educational circles show two opposite views about the dynamical analysis of institutions, one is the rational design path leaded by North, and the other is the spontaneous evolution path leaded by Hayek. The interdisciplinary research has introduced some methods of biology and physics since from 1980s. Especially, the exploration based on the laboratory and field experiments by the economists of US Santa Fe Institute represents the forward study of institutional evolution. Strong reciprocity is an important conception advanced by Santa Fe's economists in their studies. The studies show that the stable evolution of institutions would realize when enough strong reciprocators exist in a group. On the basic, the author advances a new conception of governmental strong reciprocity, and establishes an analytical frame on it about institutional evolution. Through it, the author united the two paths and develops a more comprehensive understanding of the equilibrium and evolution of institutions.The dissertation is composed of 6 parts. In the Introductory, the author reviews the development of Evolutionary Economics and the evolutionary theories, and then compares two paths as rational design and spontaneous evolution of institutional evolution research. And an initial idea is put forward on the base of the brief introduction about the Santa Fe's economists' achievements in the field. The first chapter starts with the basic conceptions, and explains the relative theories about institution, evolution and institutions evolution successively. During the process of thinking, the author makes known the view of evolutionary in the institutional research gradually. In the second chapter, the author looks into the probability of the design of institutions, through the study of cognition and rationality. In the third chapter, the author inquires into the problem of institutional origination from a sense of group through the angle of cooperation and altruism. In the fourth chapter, the author advances an innovated conception, governmental strong reciprocity, which is based on the strong reciprocity theories of Santa Fe's economists. The fifth chapter establishes a model of governmental strong reciprocity about institutional evolution based on the former chapters, which could embrace the two trains of thought to analyze the course of institutional evolution with the participation of governmental strong reciprocators. The analyze process is as follow. From the evolutionary economics theories, institution evolves spontaneously. However, the natural election of Darwin's biological evolution cannot explain the evolution of human's society sufficiently, and the Wallace's independent prove leads us to differentiate it from the evolution of common bios. Human beings have more powerful cognition ability, which makes the common views to be reached based intersubjectivity during the association. This is the fundamental of institution on the sense of cognition. Because of it, human beings get the ability of reasoning and speculation, which prepares the psychological impulsion and mental supporting for rational design of institutions. But bounded rationality sets back the efforts to the ultimate truth. However, individual is embraced in a circumstance of association, which proves a mechanism of natural election for rational design. Therefore the designs, which can be observed through elections, present features of rationality. So it's possible to put some important concepts into the study with the help of sociological means. The study of human archaeology shows that human beings prefer to associate and cooperate, which makes this species evolves successfully. Moreover, the altruistic behaviors during cooperation are elected by human beings with recognition and rationality to accumulate social capital to achieve survival. Therefore, cooperation and altruism can be explained in the cost-revenue paradigm, and then evolution can converge to point of equilibrium. During the course, a group of special individuals are evolved out, who uphold the behavioral models which embody the common significances and realize the successful evolution of group. They are called strong reciprocators by Santa Fe's economists. As idealisst, the economists do not give strong reciprocators more independent abilities supported by rationality, which are very important for rational design of institutions. So the author creates professionalized and governmental strong reciprocity. The evolution under the natural state can be explained by the former, and the evolution under the country and society can be explained by the latter. Finally, such theoretical constitution embraces rational design and spontaneous evolution of institutions together, which can make it clear of equilibrium, involution, dynamic evolution and revolution of institutions. The conception of governmental strong reciprocity open a new angle of view for research of institutional evolution, which can help us break away from the entanglement of two paths and inspect the evolution of political, economic and industrial institutions with united view. Moreover, the research differs from simple biological analogy of evolutionary economics, it regards the institutional evolution as an social adapted course for biological survival.