The Distribution Of Operation Control In Commercial Bank In China

The stock system transformation of state-owned commercial banks has whipped up a banking industry reform to the climax. The basic guiding principle of this reform has two aspects. First, it has to be successful, as it is a reform which can not afford failure. Second is the fund support of mechanism. As from the two aspects, the establishment of a sound corporate governance mechanism is the main task in this reform. For the consideration of financial stability and progressive reform, the state will maintain a relative or even an absolute main share of votes over commercial banks in a very long period of time. Thus, the desire of fundamental change of shareholding structure, thereby altering the residual control does not correspond to reality to the commercial bank in China. Meanwhile, because of the government's administrative character, the interests of all parties are destined to be considered in this reform leaded by the government. Therefore, the reform is inevitably to be completed in the common game of each party. Starting with the main participants'behavior, it has theoretical and practical meaning to research the commercial bank's operation control right besides its residual control right.In this paper, the contract theories of the distribution of control right were reviewed at first. These theories indicate that operation control right is the authority to control over the items listed in the relevant contracts, including operation decision-control right, management control right and operation supervision right. The counterpart of operation control right is residual operation right which means the ability to control over the unlisted matters.Secondly, according to the importance of impact from commercial banks'reform, this paper chooses four kinds of participant including government, shareholders, managers, and creditors to make a deep analyzes of behavior objectives and means of these participants. The analyze indicates that the administrative characteristic decides multi-functions of government, so, the target of government's control to the commercial banks not only ask commercial banks assist in finishing its different functions in other fields, but also stabilize the commercial banks at the same time by the way of using the administrative and economic means together. The shareholders'main core objective is to maximize the return, for achieving this target, the big holders wants to control the enterprise, but the small one just want to get return mainly by hitchhike. The managers behave for getting the return from the control right. But, the managers'behaviors in operation of commercial bank is complicated, for one hand, the administrators could realize their return from entrepreneur's capacity and social status only by enhancing development of commercial banks, on another hand, the managers would conflict the interest of commercial banks for its own benefit. The creditors whose behavior objective is maintain its stabilizing income get the fixed income by supervising other participants mainly. The analysis to this question is one of the focuses of the whole paper.Then, this paper supplies a metric research to measure the impact from behavior of the above participant to the achievement of commercial bank based on the behavior analyze of main participants. The result indicates that government's control to the commercial banks would impact as pendulum; this impact could be zero as the government's multi-function. The big shareholders influence to the performance of commercial bank is positive, and the independence of board is also positive to the achievement of commercial bank. The control from administrative level would influence the commercial bank's performance positively or negative if its control is out of supervision. The creditors control would impact commercial banks performance positively.Combining of the qualitative method and metric method, generalization method and deductive method, game theory together, this paper draws the flowing conclusion: (1)the government should decrease the interposition; (2) the government should maintain the conditional control right which has to make the micro-economy and development of commercial banks been considered together; (3) the managers should get the real operational control right; (4) the board should improve the supervision; (5) enhancing supervision from creditors by encouraging commercial banks to issue bonds, building deposit insurance system and market withdrawal system.