Custom Proto-Institution Of Agricultural Land And The Implementation Mechanism

As a spontaneous internal institutional arrangements ,custom proto- institution is not limited to the "the custom economy", but there is widespread in the modern market economy. Human economic behavior is controled not only by the invisible hand of market mechanism and the governmental allocation of this visible, but by the invisible hand of another, that is the custom adjustment. People have lived in the world of custom, especially in rural areas. Agricultural custom in general are formed in the game with each other people,which has been recognized by the vast majority of the community,therefore, agricultural custom are often self-interested parties within the community. As far as institutional economists concered,the institution is extremely important, but the implementation of the institution will not be worse than no it. So through sorting out the thinking of Marx, Commons Marshall and other classics million agricultural custom , accessing to other literature, surveying and analying Game ,this paper on the role of the invisible hand of custom institutional principles explores the mechanism based on the evolution of agricultural custom million for the institution and its implementation mechanisms, The main contents and conclusions are as follows :First, the effective functioning of the market mechanism is relied not only on the invisible hand of the market,but also on the custom proto- institution .As another invisible hand, the custom proto- institution on people's choice is extremely important. The custom proto- institution has been relative stability, the broad masses and the external compulsion, acquiescence, and plasticity. From Evolutionary Economics perspective, the evolutionary mechanism for custom proto- institution at least includes genetic mechanism (replication), variation mechanism (create novel mechanism) selection mechanism and applicability of learning mechanism (genetic mechanism (replication mechanism), mutations mechanism (originally generative me chanism) selection mechanism and adaptive learning mechanism). The relationship between culture and customs is complex, on the one hand, the custom proto-institution loads and maintains cultural million; the other hand, culture as a "spiritual" of custom proto- institution becomes change and continuity of the evolution of a "gene." "Cultural-meme" is key to understand the enculturation mechanisms and cultural diffusion .The evolution of custom proto- institution is on the meme of the mechanism through enculturation mechanisms and the cultural diffusion.Second, stored on Marx, Commons, Muller, Marshall and other classics theory of the origin of the custom of agricultural land ownership, agricultural circulation practices, agricultural land inheritance customs, and the custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices sorting out some ideas, such as leasing system or the price of agricultural land, Marx's theory of Custom proto- institution of agricultural practices we have today is of important guiding significance to study agricultural practices, at the same time, and also has inspected the Germanic custom, France and the traditional Chinese community who exist in the system.Third, custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices is the most basic unit of analysis of the agricultural institution, but also the most ancient, there the longest agricultural land, agricultural land to reflect its ownership rules, self-imposed contract, third parties and the rules of certain important aspects of the system, such as agricultural land, including agricultural land area of measurement practices, Property agricultural practices, the circulation of agricultural practices and so on. The agricultural custom proto- institution of traditional and modern societies have an important impact on agricultural land property rights institution. Different parts of our natural, geographical, cultural, ethnic and economic diversity and differences in level of development, led to the difference and diversity of agricultural custom proto- institution.Fourthly, the agricultural property custom proto- institution is extremely important in the the agricultural custom proto- institution arrangements. Rights or property rights is more close contact with customs .It is not only a source of property rights, but property itself is the result of custom continue to evolve, or property is institutionalized custom. Marx was also conducted in-depth study of property rights institution of a civil society before in his. thereby creating a Marxist. Engels on the theory of property rights practices. The Origin of Custom Property Right of Farmland can be a simple game model to show that The model shows that in the absence of a third party under the conditions of the design, our scarce land resources in the case of self-organizing into a mutually beneficial property custom proto-institution. Meanwhile, the empirical results of this model not only provides a certain level of support, but also help us to better understand the origin of the agricultural property custom proto- institution.Fifth, The implementation mechanisms for the agricultural custom proto- institution includes self-enforcing mechanism and the third-party involvement mechanisms. These factors about agricultural custom proto- institution on the implementation mechanism shoud been seen from multi-angle, multi-level analysis. So the writer establishs a comprehensive analytical framework to explore.Sixth, in the process of the countryside agriculture circulating,Because most farmland is circulated by generally all oral agreements and has not signed the written agreement to the both side,it is essential for farmland to circulate the effective implementation of the agreement to keep one's word and believe in the other side by oneself. This text introduce, play chess model analyze farmland flow, turn over formation mechanism that Cheng believe in between peasant households repeatedly. It is that the market economy must use the foundation stone that the health operates to believe in, it is indispensable to believe in the operation of the leasing market of farmland, But on the market of agricultural land rent, it is difficult to observe and measure the belief. The research results of experiment economics is helpful for the settlement of this problom .The Introducing the research of experiment economics indicates that : In the course of leasing of farmland, different trust that leases between both sides is different,Difference of trust not only influence current period lease choice of agreement, will exert an influence to lease behavior and implementation to lease system in the future; Meanwhile, it relates to lease prices even to believe in, required rental of the lesser and the lessee's trust are obvious relevant relations of defeat;It has positive roles that the high efficiency to the leasing market of farmland of higher trust is operated. and ,this text also analyzed the mechanism that can be implemented of the oral agreement oneself between peasant households from believing in the visual angle of (trust game) .Seventh, the implementation of the agricultural custom proto- institution needs the correlative people to maintain the smooth participation. The agricultural custom proto-institution has to be self-implementing because an important aspect is the correlative litigant who sees their reputation import,that is say the reputation of an effective mechanism is to promote the agricultural custom proto- institution implemented. KMLW's law about repeated game states that While farmers in choosing to recognize each other agricultural custom farmers property rights (cooperation), the ire of other farmers do not recognize their own land custom property (NCCTs) risk, but if their choice uncooperative, it is revealed to the non-cooperation. The proceeds will lose access to long-term cooperation might (if the other side is the type of cooperation). If a sufficient number of repeat Game, future earnings will exceed short-term gains, Even if a household is in nature is not cooperated, but the game began. Each participating farmers want to establish a cooperative image, the other that it was like cooperation; Only towards the end of the game, farmers can participate in the reputation established by the exhaustion of their one-time cooperation will stop. Relevative game perspective, the main leasing of agricultural land is based on the trust relationship between blood relations and the limited area relationship, a game in the field not only affect their choice of strategy of the game proceeds Moreover, it will also affect his reputation, the reputation as a social capital will affect their game in the relevant jurisdictions's strategic options Therefore villages Game effective embedded leasing of agricultural land to the community to exchange their survival hinges domain repeated games, and its basic trading area overlapping jurisdictions and community exchange information with complete signal transduction efficiency. Game makes the association strong correlation trading domain and domain double punishment mechanism for the exchange of community confidence, non-agricultural land leasing practices of the high cost of default (because of the discount factor greatly benefit from the current default) Nash equilibrium of this game will be (letting compliance), embedded in the social domain and the related exchange of evolutionary stable strategy game will be (co-cooperation) agricultural practices so as to achieve a virtuous circle of implementation million.Eighth, like other system's implemented with cost and benefits, regardless of the system of self- the custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices implemented or a third party involved in the implementation, we are able to analyze the cost and benefits of the system. For the main, the benefits and cost of implementing the system is the standard of comparison, in this paper, In particular, we emphasize psychological profit and mental cost to the impact of the implementation of the system.Ninth, the custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices can be implemented to analyze from the perspective of punishment. From the main punishment, punishment is the main form of self-punishment and penalizes others. From the perspective of punishment for analysis Institutional mechanisms for the implementation of agricultural practices can be divided into self-punishment through the self-enforcement mechanisms and penalties through third parties implementation mechanism. The custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices has to be self-enforcing mechanism, there are two mechanisms at work : First, self-reinforcing mechanism. The second is a self-correcting mechanism, or as self-punishment mechanism. Coupled with the economic entities with opportunism, can make self-punishment mechanism is not completely self-assurance custom proto- institution of agricultural land practices, hence the involvement of a third party, and the implementation mechanism for the imposition of punitive on the implementation of the custom proto-institution of agricultural land practices is of great significance.