Study On Value And Realization Mechanism Of Pull Supply Chain Information Sharing

Information sharing as an important research direction of supply chain management,domestic and foreign scholars has been concerned of it, they have carried out large amount ofresearch, and find that under certain circumstances, information sharing can be effective to reducethe supply chain uncertainty, information asymmetry and "bullwhip effect". It can improvecustomer satisfaction while cutting down costs, and greatly enhance the efficiency of supply chain.With the boom of information technology, and e-Business has been the main platform of business,enterprises are pushed into a global competition based on Internet, traditional supply chain ischanging into pull type supply chain, pulling supply chain mode is becoming the main operatingmode of supply chain. As a specific supply chain mode, pull type supply chain has its features, sostudy of information sharing in pull type supply chain will different from traditional supply chain.Therefore, research results and conclusions in traditional supply chain can't be applied to pulltype supply chain, and can't provide theoretical guidance for supply chain enterprise. In the newtimes, some new changes have appeared on the supply chain traditional structure. Existingresearch has not build effective theoretical analysis system and methods mechanism, which canguide pull type supply chain to realizing information sharing. The paper will research pull typesupply chain information sharing from value of information sharing, value realization andincentive mechanism. This not only enriches the supply chain theory to some extent,but also putsforward to better solutions for supply chain partners to realizing information sharing undere-commerce.Firstly the paper defined the concept and characteristic of information and informationsharing in pull tupe supply chain, then analyzes main content and main technology of informationsharing, based on this, puts forward to four information sharing mode.Secondly one of the essence of supply chain management theory is to get the best supplychain performance and favorable competitive advantage through closed coordination andcollaboration between supply chain members. In actual operation, coordination and collaborationbetween supply chain members reflects on information sharing largely. Only through quantitativeanalysis the value of information sharing, the profits generated by information sharing will promote the investment on information infrastructure, improve supply chain members'information level, and promote supply chain members' integration. Against pull type supplychain, the paper establishes separately manufacture, retailer and total supply chain profit modelbased on single-cycle newsboy model, takes ordering quantity and repurchase price as variables,derivates and anlyzes the added value of supply chain members that information sharing brings.Thirdly, in fact, information sharing can not always increase social welfare, this is becausethere are fierce competition between similar products enterprises, information sharing not onlyaffects involving members of supply chain, but also leads to supply chain other members' (notinformation sharing member)interactive reaction, some is negative. The paper proposes fourscenarios: only retailers can share information; both manaufacturer and all retailers can shareinformation; both manaufacturer and all participating retailers can share information; onlymananfacturer can share information, under each scenarios, the paper establishes seperaterlymanaufacturer and retailer three-stage un-cooperation game model, and takes wholesale price ofmananfacturer and margin of retailer as variables, derivates and analyzes income of manaufactureand retailer. Then the paper compares income of manaufacture and retailer and wholesale pricedifference among all scenarios, based on this, compares supply chain total profit of everyscenarios, thus obtains the optimal.Fourthly in pull type supply chain, information sharing makes the whole supply chain toincrease profit expectations, but not all supply chain members's expected profit increases, i.e.uneven distribution of shared interests, just as study of chapter five, this is possible to causesupply chain enterprise not to participate in information sharing, even remove from entire supplychain. There are also some other reasons, such as cost of information sharing, lack of credit, etc.So appropriate incentives must be taken to realize information sharing. The paper analyzes thereason hindering information sharing and incentives strategies. Based on this, the paper adoptsinformation coupling to detemmine degree of information sharing, and through informationsharing interests Game Analysis, puts forward to information sharing incentive mechanism basedon benefit sharing contract.