A Research On The Game In Enterprises Under The Mixed Ownership

How to define the main bodies and contents of the ownership of an enterprise is the key to further our understanding of this concept. Through answering this question, the dissertation tries to introduce a new concept—the mixed ownership of the enterprise, which is defined as the right that all participating parties in an enterprise have to claim the surplus of the enterprise. Here, the participating parties include the enterprise's shareholders, creditors, managers, staffs and the government. Thus, the structure of the mixed ownership determines the distribution of interests among the participating parties, so this issue is also associated with the problem of interest's distribution. Moreover, the structure of the mixed ownership of an enterprise determines and affects the behavior of the participating parties, and to a great extent, determines the efficiency of the enterprise. How to arrange the mixed ownership so that all the participating parties could be best motivated? This question concerns with the field of the enterprise incentive. However, the structure of mixed ownership of an enterprise is not designed by some people, it is exogenous, an equilibrium result of the game which is played by the participating parties under certain circumstances. This dissertation focuses on the gaming process within the enterprise and carries out researches on the following aspects:1. There are different understandings of the ownership of the enterprise in the theoretical field. This dissertation comments on some opinions, analyzes causes of arguments, and points out that some questions must be answered in order to further our comprehension of the concept. Through answering these questions, the concept—the mixed ownership of the enterprise is introduced.2. The mixed ownership emphasizes that as owners of an enterprise, shareholders, creditors, managers, staffs and the government should share the enterprise surplus. The dissertation expounds theoretically that this proposition is reasonable and economic. It analyzes the value of the participating parties in an enterprise for the enterprise and emphasizes especially that it is an inevitable trend of the knowledge-based economy that the owners of human capital should share the enterprise surplus. 3. From the perspective of Pareto Optimum, setting the maximization of the net surplus of an enterprise as the enterprise's goal, the dissertation analyzes the characteristics of the optimal structure of mixed ownership an enterprise should take on. Guided by the methodology of economics, using the game theory as the analysis tool, the dissertation constructs a theoretical analysis framework of the game in the enterprise under the concept of the mixed ownership.4. Using the established theoretical analysis framework, investigate some typical ownership structures of enterprises. Especially, a detailed analysis is carried out to examine the stock-cooperation enterprises occurring in China's enterprise reform. The study points out the problems brought possibly by the stock-cooperation system and discusses the feasibility to apply Pareto improvement to the ownership structure of a stock-cooperation enterprise.5. Under the theoretical analysis framework, set up a more general model of the enterprise's game relationship . Respectively, under symmetric and asymmetric information, develop the research on the game in the enterprise, including solving the game and analyzing the characteristics of the structure of mixed ownership which is an equilibrium result of the game, Studying the managers'and staffs'choice of effort level under certain mixed ownership and further analyzing the incentive mechanism implicated in the arrangement of mixed ownership under asymmetric information.6. From the perspective of the game, analyze the effect of the enterprise income tax rate and the personal income tax rate on the equilibrium result of the game in the enterprise and discuss government's determination on income tax rates. Introduce the bankruptcy risk and supervision cost of creditors into the theoretical analysis framework and study the creditor's behavior in the game. From the viewpoint of agency costs, study the decision on the amount of debt of an enterprise.7. Analyze the effects on the equilibrium result of the game by such factors, as the information structure of the enterprise, the game players'attitude toward risk and the enterprise's running state. Try to demonstrate in terms of economy that it is these factors and the game players'pursuit of maximizing their profit determine the structure of the mixed ownership of an enterprise, determine the distribution of the enterprise surplus among the participating parties and the effort level of the participants, and further determine the efficiency of the enterprise. The significance of the research carried out by this dissertation is that through setting up the concept of the mixed ownership of the enterprise, bring shareholders, creditors, managers, staffs and the government into the analysis of the game. On this basis, establish a theoretical analysis framework of the game in the enterprise under the concept of the mixed ownership and relevant mathematics models and develop a more general research on the game in the enterprise. Therewithal, we can say that the current organizing forms of the enterprise, as the stock system, the stock-cooperation system, etc., are all specific manifestations of the mixed ownership. Therefore, under the same theoretical analysis framework, we can analyze the various current enterprise systems, explain theoretically the problem occurring possibly in the reform of the state-owned enterprise, and explain such reforming practice as the stock-cooperation system, and finally offer a theoretical instruction for problem-solving and improvement of the structure of the mixed ownership of the enterprise.