A Research On Relationship Of Managerial Ownership Incentive And Performance Of Listed Company In China

In China, with the exploration of establishing modern enterprise system, ownership incentive mechanism, such as stock options, managerial ownership and so on, is being or will be introduced to the process of enterprises reform. Even if a number of theoretical and empirical accomplishments concerning managerial ownership have been achieved through the study of scholars around the world, it is still in fierce argument that what it brings to us in theory and in real corporate operation. It is worthy thorough analysis that whether we should carry out this mechanism universally in state-owned enterprises.After the statement of Principal-agent Theory and Human Resource Capital Theory, this paper introduces the Beyond Property-Right Theory specifically. And then it analyzes the relationship between managerial ownership incentive and enterprise performance on the frame of the Beyond Property-Right Theory,at last, it gets the conclusion that profit incentive can play its function that stimuli the Entrepreneur to increase efforts and inputs only under the condition of market competitiveness. According to the conclusion, this paper comes up with the study hypothesis: Under the different market competitive conditions, there are obvious differences on the impact of manager ownership incentive system on Enterprise Performance. On the basis of theory analysis, this paper assumed that the holding Proportion is independent variable and integrated financial performance is dependent variable, applied the analytical methods of Econometrics to setting regression models based on the samples of the monopoly industry and competitive industry of listed companies in China, and then make the statistical testing to the assumption. Under the testing, the assumption above is proved in a large degree, that is, there is no impact on enterprise performance on listed companies in China who implement the Managerial Equity Incentive in the monopoly industry; there is positive impact on enterprise performance on listed companies in China who implement the Managerial Equity Incentive.Consequently, this essay suggests that it is imperative to insist the managerial ownership incentive policy, control monopoly behavior and introduce market competition and supervision.