A Study On Coordination And Game In Short Sales Cycle Supply Chain

It is indispensable for any modern enterprise to focus on supply chain management and coordination in order to survive in fierce competition. The features of being both independent and interdependent among supply chain members in aspects of their respective interests and strategies lead to discrepancy of expected utilities in centralized and decentralized decision modes. In addition, they reflect Pareto improvement of supply chain's whole profit, or the possibility and necessity of realizing supply chain coordination. Based on the natural theories such as Game Theory and Principal-Agent Theory and tools such as Calculus of Variations in supply chain coordination studies, this dissertation explores into the following core problems in supply chain coordination and games:As for the supply chain coordination in single-period game and symmetry information: Stackelberg game model is constructed on the basis of short sales cycle supply chain's Newsvendor problem in order to discover and bear out that the question has bargaining property which contains infinite Nash equilibriums. In another word, in symmetry information, the game between supply chain members equals to the bargaining problem on the premise of supply chain's optimal expected profit, and the allocation proportion depends on the factors such as each member's strength. In view of short sales cycle supply chain's actual condition, overstock risk-averse factor is put forward to describe actions of risk-averse decision makers, and quantified conclusion is achieved by comparison with risk neutral member's decision-making process: as for the overstock risk-averse retailer, manufacturer is required to give stronger incentive force.As for the situation of single-period game and asymmetry information: the incentive mechanism of screening private information for short sales cycle supply chain is extended to generalized hypothesized condition. It is proved that the game between private information's concealing and screening makes it impossible to realize the Pareto optimal coordination. Furthermore, it is discovered that, in asymmetry information short sale cycle supply chain, the principal-agent relation of private information's concealing and screening will bring on extra information rent for the agent (retailer).In the following chapter, this dissertation advances the game features of being long-term, repeated and dynamic in short sale cycle supply chain, which are significant and valuable for the current research. On this establishment, it goes on analyzing two types of important dynamic game problem: in short sales cycle supply chain, the repeated game on the basis of discrete time and the differential game on the basis of continuous time. And a series of important outcomes are achieved as follows.In the first type of dynamic game:The distinctive characteristic of asymmetry supply chain information in long-term cooperation is brought forward: the long-term cooperation relationship is steady with single-period game content changing. On this basis, with regard to information screening in long-term cooperation, this dissertation analyzes information which is maybe ex-post verifiable and linked across periods, discovers and proves that there exist Ratchet Effect in screening private information which is ex-post unverifiable and linked across periods: Due to the attention to the long-dated interest, the information leader (the inspired member) tends to conceal his private information, which leads to invalidation of the original information screening mechanism. It discovers that the problem of screening information ex post verifiable and linked cross-period is likely to be automatically alleviated owing to long-term cooperation and long-dated profit. Its critical point is decided by a certain quantity relation among information rent, single-period cooperation benefit and the probability of screening the concealed information.The construction of agent's reputation model in repeated game according to moral risk and incentive issue in supply chain bears out that this reputation model possesses implicit incentive function to the agent's (manufacturer's) moral risk. The dissertation studies the trigger strategy for the principal and discovers if the parameters (order quantity with best reputation, whole-sale price, probability of market demand confusion, agent's reservation utility and private information value) satisfy a certain quantitative relation, trigger strategy can totally eliminate agent's moral risk.The second type of dynamic game is the issue of differential game on the continuous time basis. The dissertation advances the concept of supply chain reputation model on the establishment of the opinion of optimizing supply chain Pareto optimal profit, and explores into the differential game for each member's reputation maintenance and effort when constructing supply chain reputation. It's found that there is sufficient condition of Nash equilibrium and each member's optimal differential game: if the quasi constraint equations system has solution, it can lead to the corresponding Nash equilibrium and optimal differential game for each member.In addition, the dissertation provides general thought for analyzing supply chain differential game according to the analysis process of optimal differential game and equilibrium condition in supply chain reputation model.In the last chapter, there is a brief discussion about the orientation of further study.