Research On Operation Optimization And Cooperation Mechanism In Supply Chain Based On Carbon Emission Reduction

With the worsening of the climate, there is a growing consensus that thegreenhouse gas emissions is the main cause of global climate change and frequentextreme weather events, and the carbon emissions generated by human in economicactivity is a major source of greenhouse gases. This thesis aims to investigate thepotential impact of carbon emissions reduction on operational optimization andcoordination in the supply chain from the perspective of operations management.Based on operations management, supply chain management, organizationaleconomics, optimal control theory and game theory, the thesis studies the low-carbonproduct line pricing of enterprise and cooperation mechanism designing on carbonemissions reduction in a supply chain under the constraint of productions’ emissions.Using mathematical modeling method, this thesis discusses the decision-making ofemissions reduction and low-carbon product line pricing about single enterprise, thestrategy about cooperation on carbon emissions reduction in two-stage supply chainwith single-period and the strategy about long-term emissions reduction cooperationin a supply chain, providing the theoretical basis for operational optimization andcoordination in a supply chain under low-carbon era. The main research contents areas follows:1. The decision-making of carbon emissions reduction and low carbon productline pricing of enterpriseBased on the cap and trade policy, we set a model for the pricing of product lineto provide different pricing solutions according to different product emissionsreduction, which helps to lead enterprises to maximize their profit. This model showsthe optimal amount of emissions reduction of product and the optimal added amountof retail price. The various solutions allow customers to choose products bythemselves based on their private information, which contributes to the differentiationof customers and the market segmentation.2. Joint reduction decisions in two-stage supply chain with single-periodproblem(1) Revenue-sharing contract in a supply chain under cap and trade regulationWith the instruction of the cap and trade policy, we study the coordinationmechanism design of the supply chain which consists of one supplier and one retailer.Based on the assumption that demand is affected by emissions reduction rate, wedevelop a retailer-driven revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, and then establish a Stackelberg game model where the retailer is the leader and themanufacturer is the follower to obtain the optimal emissions reduction rate andsharing ratio. By contrasting different situations, we show that revenue-sharingcontract can motivate the manufacturer to improve the emissions reduction rate,increase the profit of the supply chain and realize the Pareto improvement.(2) Joint reduction mechanism in a supply chain with manufacturers’ competitionunder the constraint of emissions of productionThe section focuses on joint emissions reduction in two-stage supply chainconsisting of one single retailer as leader and two competitive manufacturers asfollowers under the ‘cap-and-trade’ system. Given that product demand is effected byits reduction rate and low-carbon promotion, and the two products have partialsubstitutive effect, this section establishes the two stage dynamic game model whichhas the same selection and researches joint emissions reduction mechanism whichconsists of emissions reduction of production and retailer’s low-carbon promotion.Through backwards induction method, the optimal reduction rate and low-carbonpromotion can be obtained. By the comparison between joint emissions reduction andemission reduction only by manufacturer, it can be concluded that when retailer’s unitprofit ratio of its two products satisfies a certain condition, the retailer has motivationto participate in the joint emissions reduction by providing different levels of lowcarbon promotion for the manufacturers, and the manufacturer’s emissions reductionrate has increased under the cooperation. The profit of enterprises involved in thesupply chain have also increased.3. Dynamic cooperative reduction of carbon emissions decisions in two-stagesupply chain(1) Dynamic optimization about vertical cooperative reduction of carbonemissions in a supply chainGiven that intertemporal effect about cooperation on carbon emissions reductionbetween the upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain and productdemand is effected by its carbon emissions, dynamic optimization about verticalcooperation on carbon emissions reduction is discussed based on differential game ina two-stage supply chain consisting of a single supplier and a single manufacturerunder low-carbon era. A Stackelberg differential game model was built with theemissions reduction process in a supply chain in which manufacturer is a leader andsupplier is a follower. By solving the model, the optimal feedback equilibrium strategy with long-term cooperation of the supplier and the manufacturer aboutemissions reduction and their own optimal value function of profits can be obtainedrespectively, and the optimal trajectory of products’ carbon emissions also can befound. Finally, through a numerical example, we showed how the long-termcooperation strategies on carbon emissions reduction of manufacturer and suppliercould affect the carbon emissions of product, and provide the theoretical basis forlong-term vertical cooperation of emissions reduction in the supply chain.(2) Dynamic coordination about vertical cooperative reduction of carbonemissions in a supply chainWe analyze the Stackelberg game scenario in which manufacturer is a leader andsupplier is a follower in the supply chain and the other scenario in which verticalcooperation between manufacturer and supplier about carbon emissions reduction forlong-term, and then solve this differential game used HJB equation to obtain feedbackequilibrium strategy and the optimal value function of profit about manufacturer andsupplier as well as the optimal trajectory for carbon emissions reduction of product.After that, comparing the two feedback equilibrium strategy, we find verticalcooperation strategies about emissions reduction can improve the emissions ofproduct, and the profits of supplier and manufacturer, as well as the entire supplychain system are higher than non-cooperation, so that it achieves coordination amongthe supply chain.