A Study Of Cost-reimbursement In Defense Procurement R&D

With socialist market economy system being progressively established and national defense investment main part pluralism process being orderly propelled, defense procurement, especially defense research and development (R&D) appears more and more in our defense equipment development practice. In a certain range, carrying out defense R&D market operation gradually becomes effective means and important choices to promote defense technology innovation. Therefore, in order to promote defense technology system innovation and improve sustainable development of defense technology industry and weapon equipment, it is very important to launch and increase researches on defense procurement R&D and some related issues.The present dissertation sets out to study the cost-reimbursement in defense procurement. By constructing a model of a defense procurement R&D project"design competition", it analyzes manufactures'strategy actions and discusses the validity and dynamic consistency of reimbursement based on certain rate. According to new development in defense procurement R&D practice, it proposes a new defense procurement R&D cost-reimbursement method and also makes initial investigation of defense R&D cost-reimbursement issues.At first, by analyzing defense procurement R&D project"design competition", the dissertation constructs a competition model based on defense procurement R&D cost-reimbursement. This model uses monopolistic contract in the production phase as a main subject, and regards all manufactures that participating in"design competition"as participants with complete rationality. According to manufacture's assessment of monopolistic contract in"design competition"and manufactures'action order in the game, it divides the model into strategy competition model, extensive competition model and Bayes competition model. These models can describe strategy actions taken by manufactures in"design competition", it lays foundation for government to do researches on validity and dynamic consistency of cost-reimbursement policy.The dissertation mainly discusses validity and dynamic consistency of government cost-reimbursement policy. By analyzing strategy action taken by manufactures in"design competition", it makes a study of manufactures'investment equilibrium in the competition model when government carries out reimbursement based on certain rate, and validity of reimbursement based on certain rate policy .By analyzing influences on competition model equilibrium such as assessment of monopolistic contract, differences between manufactures'abilities, manufactures'action order and imperfect information, it proposes conditions that ensure reimbursement based on certain rate can effectively be carried out. It comes to the conclusion that: in certain conditions, government can control the manufactures'actions by choosing the proper R&D investment compensation rate.By constructing game model, it studies when government adopts reimbursement based on certain rate for manufactures'R&D investment, how the creditability of the government's promise influences manufactures'investment equilibrium, and it discusses the dynamic consistency of reimbursement based on certain rate policy. It concluded that only if government limits its own action of adjusting compensation policy and makes its promise credible can it make sure that defense procurement R&D cost reimbursement has dynamic consistency. According to the latest practice of defense procurement R&D, it investigates a new model of defense procurement R&D cost-reimbursement, i.e. cost-reimbursement bases on quota, and it also discusses the validity of reimbursement bases on quota. By analyzing influences on competition model equilibrium such as assessment of monopolistic contract, differences between manufactures'abilities, manufactures'action order and imperfect information, it proposes conditions that ensure reimbursement based on certain rate can effectively be carried out. The conclusion is that: this cost-reimbursement base on quota is not only simple and can be induced to the given equilibrium, but in defense procurement R&D practice, it is easier and more practical for military to control its total cost-reimbursement.Finally, the dissertation has initial discuss on defense procurement R&D cost-reimbursement and analyzes the latest development of defense practice and defense technology industry. It proposes questions and some related suggestions on the basis of analysis on current situation of defense R&D research and offers decision-support for defense procurement R&D project"design competition".At the end of the dissertation, it raises issues which should be further studied.