Study On The Interest Conflicts Among Shareholders Of Listing Company In China's Market

This article concentrates on discussing the interest conflicts among the shareholders of company with integrated equity structure.The theory of corporate governance was mostly dedicated to the analysis on the agency problem between owner and manager in modern company, which suppose that shareholders belong to the homogeneity group with same target. However, the supposition was denied directly because of the widespread existence of the interest conflicts among the shareholders. The main problem of the company with integrated equity structure is the interest conflicts among the shareholders and especially the controlling shareholders do harm to the interest of the company and the minority shareholders.The degree of the companies' ownership concentration in China is very high. The number of the events, which the controlling shareholders do harm to the listing companies and the minority shareholders'benefits with every kind of means, has been increasing continuously and keeping rising. By the recent - year reforms, the capital market in our country has made sinuous progress, and especially the market system is further improved by the Equity Division Reform. Under this background, it is of great practical importance to study the behavior of the controlling shareholders and the relationship of the shareholders.The total logical organization of this article is as follows:The first part summarizes and emphasizes four influence factors which bring to the conflict among the shareholders'conflicts of interest:the main characteristic of shareholder's behaviors.the difference of stockholder's liquidity.the allocation of control rights.interest-oriented mechanism.So this article proposed a hypothesis: the four factors can devise to two kinds. The main characteristic of shareholder's behaviors and the difference of stockholder's liquidity are mainly affected by system arrangement in different time, which will be weakened with the institutional changes and market development. But the allocation of control rights and interest-oriented mechanism are mainly decided by the characteristic of modern enterprise system and the contract arrangement. To solve this problem should be carried on the innovation of the system and the mechanism.The second part summarizes that the control behavior and performance characteristics of the controlling stockholder in our country and the practice of the recent - year reforms on capital market. Then this part has confirmed the forecasted hypothesis.The third part put forward to the policy suggestion on the allocation of control rights and the innovation to the interest-oriented mechanism.This article's innovation mainly manifests in following aspects:This article summarizes and emphasizes four influence factors which bring to the conflict between the shareholders'conflicts, and this induction is systematic and in an all-round way. Based on the mature principal-agent theory and the theory of controlling rights, this paper describes the control behavior and performance characteristic of the controlling stockholder, and proposes systemic innovation and countermeasure suggestion.