Study On The Local Government's Economic Behaviour In Transfer Of The Urban Land

The relation between the government and land market had been changed much from the reform of city land use system in China. However, many questions in the city land market at present, have tight relation with the local government's unnormal behavior.The local government in the transition period is a relatively independent benefit body which splits up gradually from the financial decentralization process, it have the motive to impel the local economy and hold the maximized monopoly rent with the resources under it's control. And the surplus domination to land property rights strengthened its ability to involve economy. Therefore the land resource becomes the most powerful resources to maximize the objective function of the local government. The linked pattern formed by land and the local finance, the investment, the attract bid, the financial credit ,the real estate market bring huge benefit gambling and confused the land market system. The local government in the city land market great influenced the land supply quantity and land supply way, land supply price because it has the dual role of referee and athlete, not only a administer but also a seller. The local government economic behavior is important to the city land disposition efficiency and the land market order, thus this thesis study from the view of the local government economic behavior . It will have certain theory value and the practical significance for the Chinese urban land's market reform trend.The aim of this thesis is to provide reasonable explanation and policy instruction for the local government economic behaviors of selling the urban land.And the thesis includes six chapters,the main points of each chapter as follows:Chapter one is the introduction. it explained the theoretical and realistic value of this research.and it introduces the author's approach, the innovation and deficiencyand so on based on summarize studies carried out by domestic and international scholars. Chapter two defined the local government . The local government is a peculiar subject not only in transition period but also in the land transfer market.The particularities are: it has double behavioural characteristic of"the government"and"the economic human";it has the peculiar efficacy target function; it is a peculiar monopolistic supplier and needer;it is a peculiar price ruler and a peculiar rent seeker.Chapter three analysed economic behaviours of the local government. Local government's benefit have got maximal degree embodiment in the course of selling city land under the current city land selling system. For running after political achievements and short-term budgetary income, most local government choosed the real estate exploiture, construction of urban infrastructure and attracting investments as its development route. On selling primary market in city land, the local government has very strong ability to controll city land price.So it can seek income of selling land, carry on the infrastructural investment, attract foreign direct investment cultivate real estate through price discrimination and regulations,and those four behaviors became the main measures to develop the local economy.Chapter four analysed the effects of those economic behaviours. The local government is both a political agent of the central governmen and a relatively independent benefit subject, the double figures decided its behaviours have dual effects.Scanning the effects from the visual threshold of central government,the concrete positive manifestation of dual effects are such as: hastening economic growth, pushing forward the land market, accelerating the course of urbanization , broadening a financing channel , providing the common city high grade product and so on.At the same time,the behaviors brang the macro-economy body's unstable operation,the land market mechanism's warping, land resources'unsustainable use and it increased financial risks , losed the social equity, incured society disparate development.So the effect displays two sides of positive and negative.Chapter five analysed the reasons of those behaviors. The local government non-rational economic behaviors have existence objective necessity. The thesis draws lessons from Principal-Agent Theory, inter-governmental competition theory and property right theory to analyze dual effects of local government's behaviors. First Centralgovernment-Local government:the local government's target function warped because between central government and local government the commission agent mainly related with the contracting in politics;And the second Local government-Local government:in local government's competition relation, economic competition centering on politics competition is that one kind of non-cooperation gambling;The Third, Local government-Micro subject: fuzzy property right of land provided facilitating and the stimulation to its behavior.In general the reason of the non-rational economic behaviors is not only in virtue of local government self's problem,but also dealing with relationship between local government and other subject in land market.The insufficient longitudinal restraint from the the central government and residenter, and insufficient restraint from other local government caused those behaviors together.Chapter six explained experiences from other areas.we inspected the government behavior in land market of Hong Kong, Japan and USA, and found that in the developed market economics country and region ,the purpose of government intervention to land market had been ascertained for correcting dysfunction of market. The role of government in city land market is ascertained director.The right role choice ensured compatibility between the individual target and society target of land utilization. These conclusions have provided experiences for our country.Chapter seven is the countermeasure. This chapter proposed valuable countermeasure to Standard the local government's behavior in land market. Local government's behavior choice is responded to the specific system constraints and the drive structure rationality, therefore we can change the concrete institutional arrangements which the Local authority faces, and strengthen effective incentive and restraint mechanism to cause local authority's behavior to the collective services government's request gradually under the new benefit pattern.The innovations of this paper possibly include the following aspects:First,the study have a new visual angle.This paper chose the local government economic behaviors as visual angle,and want to take the reasonable boundary between government and the land market and advance the Chinese city land market by its behavior's standard. The second,the study has a new logical beginning.It takes"the local government in land market:a peculiar behavior subject"as the logic starting point of the whole paper,the characteristic of subject decided the particularity of its behavior.The third, The paper proposed a new concept :"the surplus domination of the land property right". Because urban and countryside land property rights are at a fuzzy condition in fact,so the local government with strong negotiations strength became the final master.The fourth, under the theory supposition of"Tiebout Model",the paper analyzed the interest relations between the local government and the enterprise which takes the land as medium ,and find the essence of the relations is intergovernmental non-cooperation gambling.The fifth, through analysing relations between local government and other subjects, the paper proposed remoulding benefit pattern as countermeasure: establish cooperation between Centralgovernment-Local government; establish enterprising competition between Local government-Local government; establish service relations between Local government–microscopic subjects.