Research On Cooperation Strategy Between Manufacturers And Retailers In E-supply Chain

After the WTO accession, China's enterprises have been quickly enter the time of the global economy, faced with international and domestic competitive pressure. E-supply chain management, especially the cooperation of manufacturers and retailers in e-supply chain has been an important management problem . In e-supply chain, manufacturers and retailers belonging to different independent entities, there is channel conflict and platform conflicts, which lead to the reduction of supply chain performance and damage of members'interests. In view of this, by study the channel conflict and platform conflict in e-supply chain between manufacturers and retailers, cooperation strategies of both sides are proposed.Firstly, in the e-supply chain, if the manufacturers'electronic channels are independent from the retailers, there will be "channel conflict". The cooperation between electronic channels and retailers was studied, which retailers finished all electronic channels'orders, and manufacturers and retailers shared electronic channels'revenue. By a Stackelberg game theoretical model , it shows that retailers'cooperation choice has no effect on electronic channels'demand. With a simplified case, it gets the analytical conditions that manufacturers and retailers choose cooperation in the electronic channels. When the electronic channels are independent from retailers, by numerical examples, the effects of the wholesale prices and manufacturers'sharing proportion on cooperation are discussed, in some cases, manufacturers'electronic channels and retailers choose cooperation is the optimal strategy.Secondly, in e-supply chain, under uncertain demand, to study this phenomenon by Stackelberg game and Bayesian methods, the result shows manufacturers, which keep optimistic of future demand, lead to the price of electronic channels and retail channels increased, and the demand of electronic channels reduced. Retailers'units subsidies given by manufacturers are positively associated with the price of electronic channels and retail channels, and negative relation to the demand of electronic channels, but has no effect on the demand of retail channel.Thirdly, in e-supply chain, in order to avoid channel conflict and improve service efficiency, manufacturers outsource electronic channels'services to retailers. In the symmetric-information framework, the service-cooperation Stackelberg and Bertrand model of electronic channels and retailers in dual-channel supply chain are proposed. We found that although manufacturers outsource electronic channels'services to retailers, they still need to reduce the marginal services cost of electronic channels, and choose retailers parter with a lower marginal services cost to maintain the competitive advantage of dual channel. When retailers have the advantage of the marginal services cost, manufacturers and retailers can make a profit by improving the service level.The prices of both channel's under Stackelberg competition is lower than those of Bertrand competition. Manufacturers always prefer the leadership of pricing.Fourthly, in e-supply chain, the commodities'replaceability of ectronic and retail channels lead to channel conflict. Consider the retailers sell the complementary goods of electronic-channels commodities in the traditional retail channels,a Bertrand game model of channel-product cooperation about dual-channel supply chain is proposed. We find that if consumers is more price-sensitive to the complementary goods of manufacturers'products, it's price decrease,and the channels price of manufacturers'products increase, at the same time, the demand and profit of electronic channels increase respectively, and the demand and profit of manufacturers'products in retail channels increases. By numerical examples, if the retailer can choose a suitable complementary goods, it will realize double-win, so the channel-product cooperation strategy is feasible.Finaly, for single-manufacturer-multi-homogeneous-buyer supply chain system, based on market demand with price elasticity of uncertain demand, buyers follow Cournot game, and manufacturers follow Stackelberg game with buyers, a manufacturer-oriented electronic supply chain model is proposed. We found that manufacturers and buyers enhance their competitive advantage in vendor preferred e-supply chain, with the increase of buyers'number, manufacturers get benefit and buyers are disadvantaged. With the increase of commission rates of third-party information platform, manufacturers'revenue reduced. With the increase of its'number , buyers'acceptable commission rate is smaller, finally the availability of the conclusions in this paper are illustrated with practical examples.