The Study On Agency Cost And Its Governance Of Listed Family Business In Our Country

The study focuses on the controversy of family business agency costs in the academic community,and uses 339 listed family business data in 2006.Firstly,the paper analyses the impact from family management pattern to family business agency costs.Secondly,the paper studies the influence from governance mechanisms of listed family business to agency costs.Thirdly,the paper studies the effect on the family business agency costs by implementing salary and bonus incentive mechanism for executives.The paper comes to the following conclusions by empirical research.(1)Overall, the family management pattern is advantageous in reducing enterprise's agency cost. The effect of entrepreneur in family business to reduce enterprise's agency cost is remarkable,and the effect of the second generation of family successor to reduce the agency cost is not remarkable.Whether the Family business chooses the family management pattern or professional management pattern depends on three factors: enterprise's management characteristic,the family self-interest tendency and the length of time of the listed company.(2)For listed family business,the proportion of institutional investor stocks and the proportion of current liability can reduce agency costs;two duties unite and asset-liability ratio display negative influence on the agency cost;and the relations between the proportion of major stockholder stocks, stockholder's rights keeping in balance,the board scale,the independent director proportion and the agency cost are not remarkable.The governance mechanisms have different effect on agency cost between family management pattern and professional management pattern:in the family management pattern,the proportion of major stockholder stocks and the board scale have negative influence on the agency cost,but these two kinds of governance mechanisms have not played any remarkable part to the agency cost of professional management pattern.(3)The effect of executive salary and bonus to reduce the listed family business agency cost is remarkable.The executive's family background has the negative adjustment effect to the compensation effect,and it means that salary and bonus incentive mechanism's effect of the professional manager is more obvious than the family manager's.The family self-interest tendency also has the negative adjustment effect on salary and bonus incentive mechanism effect,and it means that the salary and bonus incentive mechanism functions comparatively worse when the family self-interest tendency is more obvious.Based on the conclusion of this thesis,the paper proposes following suggestions. (1) As for the listed family business,firstly,the listed family business should consider the choice of management pattern discretely;Secondly,the listed family business should utilize the governance mechanisms correctly,attracting institutional investors to join the corporate,and to select the current debt financing method at first;Finally, the listed family business should promote more positively the salary and bonus incentive mechanism for the professional manager,and adjust salary and bonus structure reasonably.For professional management pattern's enterprise,it may enlarge the pay gap suitably;For family management pattern's enterprise,its pay gap cannot be too big.(2) As for the government,firstly,it must cultivate the professional manager market,such as to establish professional manager database,to improve legal environment and to develop intermediaries institution.Secondly,it should improve related system to improve the effect of independent director and the debt financing. Finally,it should implement classification supervision to prohibit the collusion of the executive and the member who holds the family business.